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Abstract
This thesis consists of four essays related to optimal antitrust enforcement. The
rst essay provides a case study of EC ringleader cartels and discusses by means
of a theoretical model the e¤ect of excluding ringleaders from leniency programmes
on collusive prices. The second essay adds an experimental investigation of the
former, and examines in particular the e¤ects on cartel formation, prices and stability.
The third essay experimentally explores the substitutability of antitrust detection
rates and nes, and test whether di¤erent ne and detection rate combinations with
constant expected nes achieve an equal level of deterrence. Lastly, the nal essay
discusses the role of antitrust enforcement on collusion when rms can engage in
avoidance activities.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The dissertation consists of four essays broadly related to cartels and antitrust en-
forcement. It is meant as a contribution to selected on-going debates among practi-
tioners and academics about the optimal design of antitrust policy. While each essay
can be read independently, the thesis consists of two sets of two related essays.
The rst two essays (Chapter 2 and 3) address the design of an important in-
strument that antitrust authorities around the world have employed to ght cartels:
Corporate leniency programmes provide cartel members the opportunity to receive
a substantial reduction of (or even immunity from) their antitrust nes in exchange
for providing evidence that helps to detect and convict a collusive agreement. While
leniency programmes in di¤erent jurisdictions share many similarities, there exists
a notable di¤erence in the treatment of cartel ringleaders. Under the current U.S
leniency policy, and di¤erent to the E.U. policy, centralised cartel managersare
not eligible for amnesty or reduction in nes. Despite their prominence in case law,
surprisingly little is known about cartel ringleaders in practice, and it yet remains a
topic of debate as to which of the two alternating policies are to be preferred.
The main aim of Chapter 2: Cartel Ringleaders and the Corporate Le-
niency Programme is to contribute to this debate by rst exploring ringleaders
descriptively and then by investigating the impact of ringleader exclusion from leni-
ency on cartel prices by means of a theoretical model. The rst part of the chapter,
reports a survey of 75 European Commission cartel decisions and investigates com-
mon features and regularities of ringleader cartels. Several interesting results are
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derived. We nd that approximately one in ve cartels have an identied ringleader,
which often is the largest rm in terms of market shares. Surprisingly, there often
exists more than one ringleader with an average of about two ringleaders per cartel.
The ringleaders are found to perform a striking variety of tasks, and are on average
punished with a ne increase of about 42% due to their leading role. The second
part of Chapter 2 is of a theoretical nature and has recently been published in a
refereed journal.1 We present a model of a price setting super game with capacity
constraints, which we use to implement size asymmetry. In a fairly general setting,
we analyse the e¤ect of excluding a ringleader from leniency on the sustainable cartel
price. The model derives the result that ringleader exclusion may allow a cartel to
sustain higher prices, in particular when antitrust nes depend on individual car-
tel gains in a nonlinear fashion and the size distribution of members is su¢ ciently
heterogeneous.
In contrast to the descriptive and theoretical methodology used in the previous
chapter, Chapter 3: An experimental study of ringleader exclusion from
leniency programmes applies experimental methodology to analyse how exclud-
ing the ringleader from leniency a¤ects formation, prices and stability of cartels.
Using laboratory experiments has the advantage that we obtain full control over all
aspects of a rmsdecision making process, and all observed di¤erences between the
outcomes of an (non-)exclusionary leniency policy is linked to the variation of spe-
cic features of the treatments, and not due to unobservable di¤erences between the
U.S. and EU cartels. Using a three-rm discrete Bertrand pricing game with the
possibility of collusion, we implement two treatments which resemble the U.S. and
E.U. leniency policy. Our ndings indicate that ringleader exclusion does not lead
to greater deterrence, as a rmswillingness to engage in collusive misconducts does
not decrease. On the contrary, cartel formation may even be facilitated when the
leader is not able to obtain leniency. While we further observe a signicant increase
in the number of price deviations, indicating a destabilising e¤ect of ringleader ex-
clusion, the reporting rate of regular cartel members drop, potentially jeopardising
the overall e¤ectiveness of the leniency programme.
In Chapter 4: Antitrust and the Beckerian Proposition: the Effects
of Investigation and Fines on Cartels we take a closer look at the e¤ects of
1Bos, I. and Wandschneider, F. (2013): A Note on Cartel Ringleaders and the Corporate Leni-
ency Program, Applied Economic Letters, 20(11), 1100-1103.
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di¤erent ne and likelihood of detection combinations with constant expected nes,
in particular with respect to cartel formation, prices and collusive stability. The
background to this chapter is a prominent claim in the law and economics literature
by Becker (1968), according to which ne and detection likelihood are substitutes in
their deterrence e¤ect. This claim has inuenced IO theory as well as the work of
anti-trust authorities, leading to a recent increase in antitrust nes by the O¢ ce of
Fair Trade. The rationale behind recent moves towards higher antitrust nes is, that
a rational rm weighs the expected benets of breaking antitrust law against the
conjecture of detection rate and ne level. Hence, as screening markets for collusion
is expensive, it is optimal to reduce the probability of detection and increase the
magnitude of the nes levied upon wrongdoers. We design a cartel experiment, in
which we vary the probability of detection and the level of the antitrust ne in a
controlled manner, such that the expected ne remains the same. We nd that, in the
absence of a leniency programme, detection rates and nes are indeed substitutable.
In the presence of a leniency programme, however, a regime that embodies low rates
of detection and high nes reduces the propensity to collude and lowers the overall
incidence of cartelised markets signicantly more than a high detection and low ne
regime. This indicates that antitrust agencies can economise on enforcement costs
and achieve a higher degree of deterrence by reducing the probability of detection
and increasing the severity of the nes.
Chapter 5: An Experimental Analysis of Antitrust Enforcement un-
der Avoidance builds on the preceding chapter but directs attention to a prom-
inent limitation of high cartel nes: As rms may react to higher nes by spending
resources on avoidance, the overall welfare e¤ects of reducing detection rates and
increasing nes are not clear. To date, it has not been tested how allowing for
avoidance activities inuences insights from cartel experiments.We present a market
experiment in which we allow rms to reduce their future potential antitrust ne. We
observe that avoidance has a signicant impact on cartel formation, as rms are more
willing to collude when they are able to insure themselves against their future nes
through avoidance. Further, as suggested in Jensen et al. (2012), rms that engage
in avoidance activities achieve higher collusive prices. Finally, our results suggest
that some rms utilise avoidance procedures as an alternative means to leniency in
an attempt to avoid being punished for price deviations.
Lastly, a summary of our results appears in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
Cartel Ringleaders and the
Corporate Leniency Programme
The early bird catches the worm, but the second mouse gets the cheese
Unknown Author
2.1 Introduction
1Corporate leniency programmes o¤er cartel members the opportunity to report their
illegal conduct in exchange for full immunity or a reduction of antitrust penalties.
Although the various programmes across jurisdictions share many similarities, the
treatment of undertakings that had a central role in establishing or organising the
cartel di¤ers markedly. Most notably, such cartel ringleadersare sometimes eligible
for amnesty (e.g., in Europe), whereas in other jurisdictions they are excluded from
the leniency programmes (e.g., in the U.S.). The purpose of this paper is to gain an
understanding of cartel ringleaders and how ringleader exclusion may a¤ect collusion.
Before proceeding, it is important to clarify what we mean by cartel ringleader.
Cartel ringleader is a term used for the centralised decision maker or cartel man-
ager (Hovenkamp and Leslie, 2011) of a collusive network. While the concept of
cartel leadership has so far widely been neglected in the IO literature2, antitrust
court rulings repeatedly declared the culpability and special responsibility of cer-
tain cartel members. In their antitrust ning guidelines, the European Commission
1This chapter is in parts based on joint work with Iwan Bos. See Bos and Wandschneider (2011,
2013).
2Related is the literature on collusive price leadership. For a recent contribution in this eld see
Mouraviev and Rey (2011).
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names instigation and leadership as an aggravating role that justies an increase
in antitrust penalties. The former concerns the establishment or enlargement of a
cartel, whereas the latter applies to its operation.3 More specically, an instigator
is an undertaking that has persuaded or encouraged other rms to establish or join
a cartel by taking the initiative to suggest collusion. A rm is classied as a leader
if it was a signicant driving force for the cartel. This may include giving a ma-
jor boost to the performance of the cartel by being the rst rm to implement the
arrangement, taking voluntary initiatives to propel the cartel and, more generally,
by taking responsibility for developing the illegal agreement. Likewise, the United
States Sentencing Guidelines read that the seriousness of an o¤ence is increased if
a defendant was the organizer, leader, manageror supervisorof a criminal
activity, and further claries that the court should consider the exercise of decision
making authority, the nature of participation in the commission of the o¤ense, the
recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the
crime, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the o¤ense, the nature
and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised
over others.4
Let us now have a closer look at the leniency policy regarding ringleaders in
both the U.S. and Europe to clarify the term ringleader exclusion. To begin,
the 1993 U.S. guidelines on corporate leniency reads that a rm is only eligible for
amnesty when it did not coerce another party to participate in the illegal activity
and clearly was not the leader in, or originator of, the activity.5 The European
leniency programme became e¤ective in 1996 and initially followed the U.S. approach
rather closely. Only a rm that has not compelled another enterprise to take part
in the cartel and has not acted as an instigator or played a determining role in the
illegal activitycan obtain non-imposition or a (very) substantial reduction of nes.6
This rule signicantly restricted ringleaders by only allowing them to apply for a
3See side numbers 14-18 in Case T-15/02 BASF AG v. Commission, Summary of the Judgement,
March 15, 2006.
4See Application Note to §2R.1.1, United States Sentencing Commission (2012), Guidelines
Manual, as well as the relevant paragraph 3B1.1.
The U.S. Aggravating and Mitigating Role Adjustments Primer (2013) claries that the line
between being a organiser/leader as opposed to a being a manager/supervisor is not clearly drawn.
As a rule of thumb, organisers and leaders are engaged in the planning, developing, directing of the
crime and thus are deemed more culpable than managers or supervisors.
5United States Department of Justice (1993), Corporate Leniency Policy, para A6. See also B7.
6European Commission (1996), Commission Notice on the non-imposition or reduction of nes
in cartel cases, para B(e).
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limited ne reduction in the range of 10 to 50%. However, and in contrast to the
original 1996 leniency notice, the 2002 and 2006 revisions allow ringleaders to apply
for full immunity provided that some standard requirements are met.7
In the ensuing analysis, we use the term ringleaderbroadly in that we do not
make an explicit distinction between instigation and leadership. As to ringleader
exclusion, we distinguish between a non-discriminatory leniency programmeand a
discriminatory leniency programme. The former is used to describe the case where
ringleaders have the same rights as regular cartel members, whereas the latter refers
to a situation where ringleaders are not eligible for (full) immunity.
Understanding the impact of ringleader exclusion on collusion is not trivial. On
the one hand, knowing ex ante which of the cartel members is not eligible for amnesty
is likely to a¤ect the level of trust among colluders. In particular, the fact that a
ringleader has not much to gain from self-reporting makes it a trustworthy partner
in crime. Indeed, in a review of the U.S. corporate leniency programme, Leslie
(2006) argues in favour of a non-discriminatory leniency programme as this would
foster distrust among cartel participants. Moreover, ringleader exclusion increases
the chance for regular cartel members to be the rst to self-report, which in turn
lowers the risk of a race to the courtroom, all else equal. On the other hand,
ringleader exclusion increases the expected antitrust penalty for ringleaders, thereby
making collusion less attractive.8 Firms are likely to have a stronger incentive to
wait for others to take the lead, which makes the formation of cartels ceteris paribus
less likely. Finally, ringleader exclusion introduces legal uncertainty as it may not
always be clear when a rm is regarded a leader. This unclarity potentially leads
to fewer confessions. It is therefore a priori unclear whether ringleader exclusion
enhances deterrence or instead facilitates collusion.
In this paper, we seek to shed some light on how ringleader exclusion a¤ects col-
lusion. As not much is known about cartel ringleaders, we rst provide a survey of
75 ning decisions taken by the European Commission between 2000 and 2010. In
14 cases, leadership is identied and explicitly mentioned as an aggravating circum-
stance. A detailed analysis of these cases reveals, among other things, that (i) cartels
7European Commission (2002), Commission notice on immunity from nes and reduction of
nes in cartel cases, para A11(c) and Section B. For the rationale behind this see the relevant part
in European Commission (2002), Question & Answer on the Leniency Policy, Memo./02/23.
8As mentioned earlier, apart from being (partially) excluded, ringleaders additionally face an
increase of the basic ne. See European Commission (2006), Guidelines on the method of setting
nes imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, para A28 and United States
Sentencing Commission (2010), Guidelines Manual, para 3B1.1.
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often had more than one ringleader, (ii) the role of ringleaders was very diverse and
(iii) ringleaders were typically the largest cartel members. Next, we theoretically
analyse the impact of ringleader exclusion on the collusive price level. Specically,
we investigate a price setting supergame in which rms di¤er in terms of capacity
stocks, which is taken as a proxy for rm size. Under the assumption that cartel
prots as well as the (expected) antitrust penalty depend positively on rm size,
we nd that a discriminatory leniency programme leads to higher prices when (iv)
the joint prot maximum cannot be sustained under a non-discriminatory leniency
policy, (v) antitrust nes depend on individual cartel gains in a nonlinear fashion and
(vi) the size distribution of members is su¢ ciently heterogeneous. We also consider
the possibility of alternative prot allocation rules and establish that side-payments
are ceteris paribus most likely when the intended ringleader is the smallest rm. Our
overall ndings therefore support the imposition of antitrust penalties proportional
to rm size when ringleaders are excluded from the corporate leniency programme.
While empirical studies on cartels have identied that successful cartels create
mechanisms to share information, organise decision making and align incentives
(Levenstein and Suslow, 2006), traditionally IO economists have abstracted away
from the internal organisation of collusive agreements.9 Yet, attempts to unravel
the black box have been made by sociologists, management scientists and law-
yers. Starting with the premises that there exists a trade-o¤ between the need to
conceal the collusive agreement and the need to organise its tasks e¢ ciently, Baker
and Faulkner (1993) construct a network of all cartel participants of the Switchgear,
Transformer and Steam Turbine Generators cartel using archival data on their social
ties in order to show how the social structure inuences the cartel conduct. They
nd that the need to process vast amounts of information and to make complex
decisions lead to centralised networks in which the coreparticipants are densely
interconnected while few links between the regular cartel members exist. They fur-
ther maintain that on an individual level, managers like to be members of the core
to monitor and prevent competitors from treating their company unfairly. However,
managers also want to avoid additional risk of being detected and sanctioned that
comes with such a central position.
Another attempt to understand the organisation of collusion has been made by
Pressey et al. (2010) who examine the formal managerial structure of four EC
9Scherer (1980) even maintains that conventional economic analysis does not allow to address
the relationship between an industrys informal and formal social structure and its ability to
coordinate pricing(p. 225).
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cartel cases. They conclude that two modes of organising price-xing cartels exist (a
centralised bilateralnetwork and a decentralised multilateralform), which both
have di¤erent dening features. In particular, decentralised networks are described as
being more integrated and comparable to Joint Ventures. Members tend to be more
symmetric and have multiple communication links between them, which arguably
makes them more visible to enforcement agencies. In contrast, bilateralnetworks
are said to share properties of terrorist organisations, which are more di¢ cult to
detect and show greater exibility to react to outside shocks.
Arguing from a lawyers perspective, Hovenkamp and Leslie (2011) discuss various
decision-making schemata to explain why rms are willing to delegate decisions away
to a centralised authority. They postulate that a cartel managercan help to reduce
agency costs and align divergent preferences of cartel members.
As little is known about cartel ringleaders, there exist even less literature on
the impact of ringleader exclusion on collusion.10 To our knowledge, the only two
other papers that explicitly and extensively analyses cartel ringleaders in relation
to the corporate leniency programme are Herre and Rasch (2009) and Bigoni et
al. (2012a). Herre and Raschs study theoretically explores the deterrent e¤ect of
ringleader exclusion by considering variations in the probability of conviction. If
there is a relatively small chance of being caught, then a non-discriminatory leniency
policy is preferred as the additional information that a ringleader may provide can
be essential for cartel prosecution. By contrast, if the probability of conviction is
relatively high, then it is optimal to exclude ringleaders. The reason is that ringleader
exclusion creates an asymmetry among rms, which makes sustainability of collusion
ceteris paribus more di¢ cult. The recent experimental study by Bigoni et al. nds
that ringleader exclusion leads to higher prices, but hardly a¤ects the formation of
cartels.
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a description and
discussion of cartel ringleaders in antitrust practice. The model is introduced in
Section 2.3. Section 2.4 concludes.
10Contributions in the area of leniency include, among others, Motta and Polo (1999, 2003),
Spagnolo (2000), Aubert et al. (2006), Motchenkova and Leliefeld (2007) and Harrington (2008).
For empirical analyses compare Brenner (2009) for the European leniency programme and Miller
(2009) for the US leniency policy.
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2.2 Case Study
Before analysing the impact of ringleader exclusion on collusion, we believe it is
instructive to rst examine cartel ringleaders in practice. We want to explore the
frequency and characteristics, as well as the function and legal treatment of the cartel
ringleader. Towards that end, we have conducted a survey of 75 European Commis-
sion cartel decisions taken over the last decade. Specically, we have surveyed all
prohibition decisions and press releases concerning the policy area Cartelsbetween
January 1, 2000 and January 1, 2011.11 For each case, we rst assessed whether the
European Commission explicitly mentions the leading role of one or more cartel
members and adjusted the ne accordingly.
Before we proceed, a word of caution is in order. We are aware that the ndings
presented here may be biased in several respects. First, and inherent to all empirical
cartel studies, our sample of cartel cases may not be a good representation of the
unknown pool of cartels. Second, our sample might be a fraction of the actual num-
ber of ringleader cases. As leadership typically results in a substantial increase of
the antitrust ne (for our sample, the average ne increase is about 42%), the Com-
mission is likely to explicitly refer to a leading role only when it has su¢ cient legal
evidence available to win an appeal in court. Our sample is therefore likely to mark
a lower bound as there may have been other cases in which the Commission, despite
having some evidence of leadership, did not increase the basic ne. Finally, the vast
majority of ringleader cartels operated in manufacturing industries producing more
or less homogeneous goods; one of which included agreements between buyers and
sellers (Bitumen Nederland). It can be argued that such a buyer - seller cartel has
di¤erent structural features compared to horizontal cartel agreements.
This being said, we are condent that a discussion of some of the traits of known
cartel ringleaders is informative and useful for current and future research.
11These dates were chosen rather arbitrarily. We do not expect results to be radically
di¤erent for alternative time frames. For the selected period, we have studied all cases
that were available at the Commissions online database at the end of March 2011 (See
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/cases/cases.html).
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2.2.1 Frequency of ringleader cartels
A ringleader was identied by the European Commission in 14 out of the total
of 75 cases. This proportion of ringleader to no-ringleader cases is similiar to the
ndings in Ganslandt et al. (2010) who report identied ringleaders in 10 out of 43
observed cartel decisions. In more detail, the Aggravating circumstances paragraph
of the prohibition decision refered to those ringleaders as a "leader" in 7 cases, as an
"instigator" in 2 cases, and used both terms simultaneously in 5 cases. Figure 2.1
depicts the proportion of cartels with an identied ringleader over time. As can be
seen, the majority of indentied ringleader cases appeared before or around the 2002
leniency revision.
Figure 2.1: Number of cartels and ringleader cases over time.
0
2
4
6
8
10
C
as
es
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Decision year
Ringleader Cases No Ringleader Cases
Table 2.1 provides an overview of the identied ringleader cases by stating the
case number, case title and the name of the identied ringleaders. It further classies
the role of the leaders into either of the two categories, instigation or leadership, de-
pending on the ringleadersrole dened in the prohibition summary by the European
Commission. As can be seen in the second column of Table 2.1, a common property
of the cartels in our sample is the existence of more than one ringleader. Specic-
ally, in 10 out of 14 cases two or more undertakings shared the responsibility for
establishing or leading the cartel.12 Some cartels had multiple ringleaders operating
12For a discussion of the di¢ culties of determining a leading position in the context of multiple
leaders see Case COMP/36.545/F3 Amino acids, paras 418 and 419. Interestingly, in the U.S. it
holds that in situations where the corporate conspirators are viewed as co-equals or where there are
two or more corporations that are viewed as leaders or originators, any of the corporate participants
will qualify" for amnesty under the U.S. guidelines. See U.S. Department of Justice (1998), The
Corporate Leniency Policy: Answers to Recurring Questions.
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simultaneously, whereas in other cases members took turns. Four cartels were led
by a single undertaking and the majority had two ringleaders (the average number
of leaders is 1.79). A special case is the cartel which had three leading participants.
In Gas Insulated Switchgear, Siemens was the sole leader during most of the cartels
life. ALSTOM replaced Siemens during its temporary departure from the cartel and
this rm was taken over at some point by AREVA, which continued the leading role.
Presumably, implementing or monitoring a collusive agreement among a large
number of competitors is inherently di¢ cult, as the complexibility to coordinate in-
creases exponentially with number of rms (Scherer, 1980). As cartels might require
a leader for the sole purpose of coordinating their activities, one might conjecture
the presence of ringleaders in cartels with many participants. However, our sample
suggests that the number of ringleaders does not increase with the number of cartel
participants. For instance, in Carbonless paper there were eleven members and one
ringleader, whereas in Interbrew and Alken-Maes there were four members and two
leaders. The average number of rms involved in a cartel with one, two or three iden-
tied ringleaders is respectively 7:75, 7:22 and 11. These averages do not seem to be
notably di¤erent from average cartel sizes reported in other studies (cp. Levenstein
and Suslow, 2004b). Likewise, we observe no unusual di¤erence in terms of the mean
cartel duration. For our sample the average ringleader cartels lasted just about 92
month, or 7.6 years.
2.2.2 Ringleader characteristics
A dening feature of ringleaders is their market position. In 11 out of the 14 cases,
the largest rm in terms of market shares was one of the ringleaders. This nding
supports Ganslandt et al. (2010), which establish that ringleaders are frequently
substantially larger than other rms. There are two cases for which this was not
true. Yet, in one of these cases, Interbrew and Alken-Maes, the ringleaders were in
fact the two largest brewers in Belgium, but not in the market segment where the
cartel was active (Belgian private label beer). Likewise, the ringleaders in Citric
acid were the worlds biggest vitamin producers, but not in the relevant market
segment. A third case, Viandes Bovines Françaises, had the association of farmers
as a ringleader, which makes it di¢ cult to use market shares as a measure of market
power. Though our sample suggest a strong tendency to having the market leader
as the ringleader, it is noteworthy that in Gas Insulated Switchgear, the largest rm
left the cartel, which left space for a smaller producer to take the lead.
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Table 2.1: European Cartel Ringleader Cases 2000 - 2010
Case Title Identied Ringleader Instigator Leader
36545 - Amino Acids Ajinomoto, Archer Daniels Midland X
36490 - Graphite electrodes SGL Carbon, UCAR International X X
37512 - Vitamins F. Ho¤mann-La Roche, BASF X X
37614 - Interbrew and Alken-Maes Interbrew, Alken-Maes X
36604 - Citric acid Archer Daniels Midland, F. Ho¤mann-La Roche X
36212 - Carbonless paper Arjo Wiggins Appleton X X
37667 - Specialty Graphite SGL Carbon X X
38279 - Viandes Bovines Francaises Federation nationale bovine X
37370 - Sorbates Hoechst, Daicel Chemical Industries X
36756 - Sodium Gluconate Jungbunzlauer X
38456 - Bitumen Nederland Shell, Koninklijke Volker Wessels Stevin X X
38899 - Gas Insulated Switchgear Siemens, ALSTOM, AREVA X
38710 - Bitumen Spain Repsol, Productos Asfalticos X
39406 - Marine Hoses Bridgestone, Parker ITR X
13
2.2.3 Role of leader(s)
We identify a variety of tasks that a ringleader performs, and it is not always clear-cut
how and for which reasons the Commission decided to evaluate a particular task into
the categories of instigation vs. leadership. The role of ringleaders varied remarkably
among the cartels and often consisted of a mixture of activities related to instigation
and leadership.
Further, the line between active membership and leadership is not clearly drawn
and the Commissions argumentation does not appear coherent. In Amino acids, the
Commission nds it irrelevant whether these tasks were o¤ered to the leader by the
other participants or seized by the leader on its own initiative.13 In Graphite elec-
trodes however, Tokai was designated by the cartel to collect the volume information
but besides its active engagement Tokai was not declared a leader by the Commission.
As to instigation, the most common activity was to encourage other companies
to join the cartel. Specically, in 6 out of 14 cases the ringleader approached other
companies in order to persuade them to join the agreement. How the ringleader ap-
proached other companies varied. In some of these cases, the ringleader explained the
mechanisms of the cartel and highlighted the added value of previous arrangements.
In other cases, the ringleader invited to club meetingsor o¤ered the restructuring
of an old agreement. Perhaps surprisingly, coercion seems to have played a minor
role. In none of the cases the Commission increased the nes due to coercion. In
only three cases, there was su¢ cient evidence that leaders (ab)used their dominant
market position to discipline unwilling undertakings or to pressure rms into joining
the cartel.14
Activities concerned with the operation of the cartel (Leadership) can be cat-
egorized in four main tasks. First, in 10 out of 14 cases, leaders were the rst to
implement a collusive agreement or to announce price changes. For example, in Vit-
amins, BASF and F. Ho¤mann-La Roche took turns in announcing price changes and
then invited the other cartel participants to follow. Likewise, in Carbonless paper,
the ringleader was responsible for selecting the cartel price.15 This nding conrms
recent theoretical predictions about collusive price leadership. For instance, Ishibashi
13See COMP/36.545/F3 Amino acids para 353.
14See Marshall, Marx and Samkharadze (2011) for a description and analysis of dominant-rm
conduct by cartels.
15The reason why cartel members might want to cede their power over the price decision to a
ringleader is discussed in Hovenkamp and Leslie (2011). They argue, among other things, that a
participatory bargaining process increases the risk of detection and conviction, as each communic-
ation creates evidence against the cartel.
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(2008) establishes that under price competition with capacity constraints larger rms
have an incentive to move early. Moreover, Mouraviev and Rey (2011) show that
price leadership can facilitate collusion by allowing for more e¤ective punishments.
Second, leaders exercised tasks intended to enhance the operation of the cartel. In
9 out of 14 cases, this includes manning the cartel secretariat, collecting commercial
information and exchanging summaries, providing presentations about the state of
the industry or allocating customers. In Marine Hoses, for example, Bridgestone
allocated tenders to cartel members and provided bidding instructions and tables
indicating the actual state of tender allocation, while in Amino Acids, Ajinomoto ac-
ted as the central o¢ ce to which each lysine producer would provide monthly sales
gures. Ajinomotos job would be to keep track of the gures so that the producers
could make adjustments in their sales to limit the overall annual sales to the agreed
maximums.(Case COMP/36.545/F3 - Amino Acids para 122).
Third in 9 out of 14 cases, the leaders task was to organize the actual communic-
ation. Among other things, this includes hosting, organizing or chairing meetings,
paying bills and setting up the agenda. In Sorbates, for instance, Hoechst hosted,
organized and payed for the European cartel meetings. Finally, in 6 cases, the
ringleader acted as a representative or intermediary. In Bitumen Nederland, KWS
and Shell were both representatives of either buyer or seller groups and often negoti-
ated bilaterally to reach outcomes that were bindingfor the other participants. In
Sodium Gluconate, Jungbunzlauer negotiated between members in case of internal
rivalry.
Other activities were more specic to the need of the respective cartel. For in-
stance, in Gas Insulated Switchgear part of the leading role of Siemens was to provide
European and Japanese fellow members with Siemens mobile phones equipped with
encryption technology.
2.2.4 Adjustment to base nes
The European Commission rules that a rm that takes the role of a leader or in-
stigator bears a special responsibility, which may result in an increase of the basic
ne. We nd that, once leadership or instigation was identied as an aggravating
circumstance, ringleaders indeed received an increase of the basic ne in the range
of 30% to 85%.16 The average ne increase is about 42%. In Specialty Graphite, the
16In Graphite electrodes, the ringleader SGL was giving warnings to other companies of the
forthcoming investigations and continued the infringement after the initial investigation, which
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Commission increased the ne for SGL Carbon by 50%. SGL Carbon challenged this
outcome as it felt that the weight given to its leading role was disproportionate. The
Commission, however, justied its decision by stating that it has no obligation to
apply a mathematical formula nor is it generally bound by previous decisions".17 In
ve cases, a ringleader asked for non-imposition or a substantial reduction (> 50%)
of its ne under the 1996 leniency notice. However, these requests were rejected with
reference to their leading role. Overall, the leader received a signicant reduction of
the ne in the range of 10% to 50% in nine cases.
2.3 Model
In the remainder of this paper, we study a modied version of the price setting
supergame with heterogeneous capacity constraints as presented in Bos and Har-
rington (2010). Consider a homogeneous good industry in which a xed and nite
set of rms, denoted by N = f1; : : : ; ng, interact repeatedly over an innite, dis-
crete time horizon. Producers have constant unit cost c  0 and choose prices from
f0; ; 2; : : : ; c  ; c; c+ ; : : :g with  being small and positive. In each period, rms
simultaneously make price decisions so as to maximize the expected discounted sum
of their prot stream, where  2 (0; 1) is the common discount factor. There is
perfect monitoring in the sense that prices chosen in previous periods are common
knowledge. The production capacity of rm i 2 N is denoted by ki and we assume
that k1  k2  : : :  kn > 0, which is without loss of generality. Total industry ca-
pacity is K =
P
i2N ki and capacity stocks remain xed throughout the entire game.
Monopoly prot is (p  c)D(p) and we assume that market demand D(p) is twice
continuously di¤erentiable with D0(p) < 0 and D00(p)  0, i.e., monopoly prot is
strictly concave. Moreover, D(c) > 0 and the monopoly price is denoted by pm:
D(pm) + (pm   c)D0(pm) = 0. Consumers buy rst from the cheapest supplier(s).
Demand of rm i is then given by Di(pi;p i), which depends on its own price pi and
the prices set by all rivals p i. Firms produce to meet demand up to their capacity.
Following Bos and Harrington (2010), we make the following simplifying assumptions
on rmscapacity:
Assumption 1: ki < D(pm) and
X
j2Nnfig
kj = D(c); for all i 2 N:
might explain a proportion of the high ne increase.
17Case T-71/03 Tokai Carbon and Others v. Commission, paras 310 and 315.
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The rst part of the assumption says that each rm has insu¢ cient capacity to
supply monopoly demand. Thus, the possibility of producers being very large in
absolute terms is ruled out. Yet, they can be of signicant size in relative terms.
The second part states that any n  1 rms can meet competitive demand. Indeed,
the second part implies that there are two (symmetric) Nash equilibria in the one-
shot game. The static Nash equilibrium has all rms either pricing at c or at c + .
However, as results will be derived for su¢ ciently small , this di¤erence is negligible.
As a consequence, producers make zero prots absent collusion. A nal implication
of the assumption is that duopolistic market structures are excluded (i.e., n  3).
Albeit somewhat restrictive, it holds for the majority of industries in which collusive
behaviour has been observed.18 For example, the cartels discussed in section 2.3 all
operated in markets with more than three undertakings. Moreover, cartels compris-
ing two members form a special case when considering ringleader exclusion as the
presence of a ringleader would eliminate the race to the courtroom.
In the following, we consider the possibility of an all-inclusive price-xing cartel
and assume a proportional prot allocation rule.19 Given a common cartel price
p > c+ , individual cartel prots are therefore given by
i(p) = (p  c)D(p) ki
K
; for all i 2 N: (2.1)
Yet, by forming a cartel, rms expose themselves to antitrust enforcement. There is
a risk of being caught after each collusive period and, for simplicity, it is assumed
that conviction leads to a permanent breakdown of the collusive agreement. Let the
probability of conviction be given by  2 (0; 1). Leaving out the potential discount
due to leniency (which we will introduce later), successful cartel prosecution has rm
i paying a ne F (ki). We make the following assumption on the penalty function
F (k).
18A notable exception is the cartel agreement between auction houses Christies and Sothebys
in the 1990s. See Case COMP/E-2/37.784, Fine Art Auction Houses.
19Bos and Harrington (2010) provide various rationales for a proportional prot sharing rule.
Capacity may be taken as a proxy for market share and there exists evidence of cartels that based
their prot sharing rule on the market share of members in years prior to the cartel. For example,
in COMP/36.545/F3 Amino Acids the undertakings agreed to x future quantities based on the
sales of the previous year, while in COMP/E-1/36 604 Citric acid the basis of the market sharing
quota was the average of the last three yearssales. Moreover, the proportional rule captures the
idea that the largest rms (i.e., often the ringleaders) have most to gain from collusion as their
additional prot is highest. Hence, they have the strongest incentive to initiate an agreement.
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Assumption 2: The antitrust penalty function F (k) is continuously
di¤erentiable with F (0) = 0 and F 0(k) > 0 at all k 2 (0; D(pm)):
This assumption states that larger rms incur a higher ne in case of conviction,
all else equal. Moreover, as we assume a proportional allocation rule, nes are
positively correlated with cartel gains. While many paper on leniency use lump-
sum nes which are independent of size of the convicted rm, we assume that the
magnitude of antitrust nes depends on a rmsshare in the industry.20 This seems
to be a plausible assumption for many jurisdictions.21 For instance, the European
Commissions 2006 ning guidelines establish a link between nes and the value of
sales to which the infringement relates. More precisely, the basic ne is computed as
a proportion of the value of sales in the last business year before taxes while taking
account of the gravity and duration of the infringement. In a similar vein, the U.S.
penalty guidelines o¤er a way to determine the basic ne using the pecuniary loss
due to the o¤ense for which 20% of the volume of a¤ected commerce (i.e., total
U.S. sales revenue) is used as a proxy.22 As the precise determination of antitrust
penalties is complex and varies among jurisdictions, we do not further specify the
antitrust penalty function.23
2.3.1 Non-discriminatory Leniency: A Benchmark
In the next step, we introduce and analyse the cartels problem under the assumption
that a ringleader can apply for leniency like regular cartel members. We require
collusion to be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of the game and assume
that rms adopt grim-trigger strategies to sustain supra-competitive prices. That is,
every member of the cartel adheres to the collusive agreement until one rm deviates.
In the event of defection, the coalition collapses with a one-period time lag and all
20Contributions that treat the antitrust ne as a parameter include, e.g., Motta and Polo (1999,
2003), Spagnolo (2000, 2008) and Aubert et al. (2006). For a discussion of three levels of antitrust
ne functions (xed, proportional and more than proportional) and their impact on the prot-
maximizing cartel price see Houba et al. (2010).
21The aim of the 2006 EU guidelines revision was to better reect the perniciousness of an
infringement as well as the share of each company involved. See Press Release IP/06/857, European
Commission, Competition: Commission Revises Guidelines for Setting Fines in Antitrust Cases
(June 28, 2006).
22See European Commission (2006), Guidelines on the method of setting nes imposed pursuant
to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003 and United States Sentencing Commission (2010),
Guidelines Manual.
23For instance, in a recent study on European cartel nes, Veljanovski (2011) nds that many
aspects of the ning procedure are unexplained and that the Commission displayed excessive secrecy
in its reasoning.
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rms set stage game Nash equilibrium prices in all periods following the period of
defection.24 For ease of analysis, we assume that all members ex ante have identical
expectations about the amount of discount they might receive due to leniency. Let
this expected discount be captured by a parameter  2 (0; 1). Specically, higher
values of  correspond to larger expected reductions of the antitrust ne, all else
equal.25
Under this nondiscriminatory antitrust regime, the collusive value for rm i is
dened recursively by
Vi(p) = (p  c)D(p) ki
K
  (1  )F (ki) + (1  )Vi(p); (2.2)
which is equivalent to
Vi(p) =
(p  c)D(p)ki
K
  (1  )F (ki)
1  (1  ) : (2.3)
If a cartel member deviates from the cartel agreement, then it will optimally set a
price p . This is so, as by Assumption 2 the cheating rm produces up to capacity.
Consequently, further lowering prices is unprotable. We assume that once a rm
deviates, it cannot be convicted for its former misconduct.26 Therefore, given that
the price grid is su¢ ciently ne, optimal deviating prots for rm i are approximately
equal to (p  c)ki.
The incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) under a nondiscriminatory leniency
regime is then given by
(p  c)D(p)ki
K
  (1  )F (ki)
1  (1  )  (p  c)ki; for all i 2 N:
24Note that the grim-trigger strategy is the most severe credible threat in this setting. That is
to say, whenever some level of collusion cannot be sustained by the threat of eternal competition,
then it cannot be sustained by any other credible punishment strategy.
25One possible example for the expected discount  would be the expectations regarding an
optimal leniency policy as described in Harrington (2008). There the expected discount is captured
by n 1+n , where  2 [0; 1] gives the percentage of the penalty to be paid by the rst rm to report.
Hence,  = 0 corresponds to maximal leniency and  = 1 implies that the leniency program is
ine¤ective or absent.
26It is in the legislators interest to induce defection in order to break down cartels, hence such
behaviour should not be punished. However, allowing for antitrust enforcement after defection
a¤ects part of the analysis. In Bos and Wandschneider (2013) we allow the deviating rm to obtain
leniency. Ringleader exclusion then a¤ects both their collusive and deviating prots. Under such a
setting, ringleader exclusion always loosens the incentive constraint of regular cartel members and
tightens or loosens the incentive constraint of ringleaders.
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Rearranging gives,
(p)  (p  c)

D(p)
K
  1 + (1  )

  (1  )F (ki)
ki
 0; for all i 2 N: (2.4)
Let us have a closer look at the ICC as given by (2.4). To begin, observe that the
ICC is violated for p = c. Colluding on prices su¢ ciently close to unit production
costs is therefore not feasible, which is due to the antitrust penalty. Next, the LHS
of (2.4) is strictly concave:
00(p) =
2D0(p) + (p  c)D00(p)
K
< 0:
For collusion to be feasible, this implies that the rst order condition at c must be
positive. Taking the derivative of (p) gives:
0(p) =
D(p) + (p  c)D0(p)
K
  1 + (1  ):
Thus, a necessary condition for collusion is 0(p) > 0 or  > K D(c)
(1 a)K : Feasibility of
collusion therefore requires that rms are su¢ ciently patient and that the probability
of getting caught is not too high.27
As monopoly prot is strictly concave, (2.3) reveals that all cartel members agree
to maximize the cartel price (not exceeding the monopoly price). Therefore, the
cartel faces the following constrained maximization problem:
max
p
(p  c)D(p); (2.5)
subject to
i(p)  0; for all i 2 N:
Clearly, the cartel will optimally set the monopoly price when i(pm)  0 for all
i 2 N . However, the monopoly price may not be sustainable. To see this, notice
that 0i(p
m) =  1 + (1 ) < 0 and therefore i(p) reaches its maximum at a price
below the monopoly price. Consequently, collusion may be feasible only at a price
below the monopoly price. In the following, let p  min [p; pm] denote the solution
to (2.5), where p is the constrained solution.
27Observe that the ICCs are satised when  ! 1 and ! 0.
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Given that collusion is sustainable but not at the monopoly price, the issue to
consider is which rm has the binding ICC. The next result shows that this e¤ectively
depends on the shape of the antitrust penalty function.
Lemma 1 Suppose kj > ki:
(i) If F 0(k) < F (k)
k
, then j(p) > i(p),
(ii) If F 0(k) = F (k)
k
, then j(p) = i(p);
(iii) If F 0(k) > F (k)
k
, then j(p) < i(p):
Proof. With a non-discriminatory leniency programme, the incentive compatibility
constraint of each cartel member is of the following form:
(p  c)

D(p)
K
  1 + (1  )

  a(1  )F (k)
k
:
Taking the derivative with respect to k yields k( a(1 )F
0(k)) ( a(1 )F (k))
k2
Q 0: Re-
arranging gives F (k)  kF 0(k) Q 0:
Hence, at any price p: (i) if F 0(k)   F (k)
k
< 0, then (p) is highest for the largest
rm(s), (ii) if F 0(k)  F (k)
k
= 0, then (p) is equal for all cartel members, and (iii) if
F 0(k)  F (k)
k
> 0, then (p) is highest for the smallest rm(s).
Part (i) states that the smallest member has the tightest ICC when the antitrust
penalty function is concave. Part (ii) shows that all rms face the same ICC when
the ning structure depends on rm size in a linear fashion. Part (iii) states that the
largest member has the tightest ICC when the antitrust penalty function is convex.
2.3.2 The Impact of Ringleader Exclusion
Next, we evaluate the potential impact of ringleader exclusion on the collusive price
level and assess whether it provides incentives to compensate the ringleader for its
loss in expected leniency discount. We will show that a discriminatory leniency
programme leads to higher prices when (i) the monopoly price cannot be sustained
under a non-discriminatory leniency policy, (ii) antitrust nes depend on individual
cartel gains in a nonlinear fashion, and (iii) the size distribution of members is
su¢ ciently heterogeneous. Additionally, we nd that adopting a di¤erent prot
sharing rule is most likely when the intended ringleader is the smallest rm. In light
of available evidence from antitrust practice, we consider the use of side-payments
to compensate the ringleader possible but rather unlikely.
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Collusive Price Level
To begin, suppose the cartel has a ringleader that is not (or only partly) eligible to
apply for leniency. An e¤ect of such a discriminatory leniency policy, when compared
to the benchmark, is that the expected discount for regular cartel members increases,
whereas it decreases for the ringleader. This asymmetry is due to the fact that the
ringleader is excluded from (full) immunity and therefore will be less eager to apply
for leniency. In turn, this ceteris paribus increases the chance for regular members
to win the race to the courthouse, thereby increasing the expected discount. Let
the expected discount for the ringleader and regular members under a discriminatory
leniency programme be respectively given by l and m, with 0  l <  < m < 1.
Thus, moving from a non-discriminatory to a discriminatory leniency programme
loosens the ICC of regular cartel members and tightens the ICC of the ringleader,
all else equal. This implies that in order to assess the impact of ringleader exclusion
on the collusive price level it is su¢ cient to evaluate the change in the ICC of the
ringleader.28
In the following, let l indicate the ringleader and let kl denote its production
capacity. The ringleaders ICC is thus given by
l(p)  (p  c)

D(p)
K
  1 + (1  )

  (1  l)
F (kl)
kl
 0:
The next result shows under which conditions a discriminatory leniency policy leads
to higher prices compared to a nondiscriminatory leniency policy. In stating this
result, let p denote the optimal price of the cartel with a ringleader under a dis-
criminatory leniency regime. Additionally, dene the tightest ICC under a nondis-
criminatory leniency policy as (p)  minf1(p); : : : ; n(p)g and let k be the capacity
level for which (p) = 0.
Theorem 2 Suppose that there is a ringleader and that collusion is viable under a
nondiscriminatory leniency policy.
p > p if and only if p < pm and 1 
1 l >
F (kl)
kl
F (k)
k
:
28Notice that the same logic applies when there is more than one ringleader. In that case it would
be su¢ cient to analyze the impact of ringleader exclusion on the ringleader with the tightest ICC
under a nondiscriminatory leniency program.
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Proof. First, notice that the cartel does not nd it optimal to set a price in excess
of the monopoly price. Consequently, if p = pm, then p 5 p. Suppose therefore
that p < pm, which implies l(p) = 0. As ringleader exclusion loosens the ICC of
regular members and tightens the ICC of the ringleader, p is sustainable under
a discriminatory leniency regime when l(p) = (p). If l(p) < (p), then
p < p. Likewise, p > p when l(p) > (p), or (p c)

D(p)
K
  1 + (1  a)

 
a(1  l)F (kl)kl > (p   c)

D(p)
K
  1 + (1  a)

  a(1  )F (k)k : Rearranging gives
1 
1 l >
F (kl)
kl
F (k)
k
.
The above result indicates that ringleader exclusion allows the cartel to sustain
higher prices when three requirements are met. First, the optimal cartel price under a
nondiscriminatory leniency policy must lie strictly below the monopoly price. Clearly,
if the joint prot maximum can be sustained without ringleader exclusion, then the
introduction of a discriminatory leniency policy will induce a weakly lower cartel
price. Second, the antitrust penalty must depend in a nonlinear fashion on cartel
gains. If nes are proportional to rm size, then the RHS of 1 
1 l >
F (kl)
kl
F (k)
k
is equal
to one whereas the LHS is strictly smaller than one. Finally, the size distribution
of rms must be su¢ ciently heterogeneous. This is because when all rms are of
equal size the RHS is equal to one independent of the shape of the antitrust penalty
function.
If we embrace the nding in Section 2.3 that ringleaders are typically the largest
rms, then Theorem 2 supports a proportional or more than proportional ning
structure. By Lemma 1, we know that the largest cartel member has the tightest ICC
under a nondiscriminatory leniency programme when the antitrust penalty function
is linear or convex. Thus, in these cases k = k1 and therefore
1 
1 l >
F (kl)
kl
F (k)
k
is violated
when kl = k1. Yet, in this case ringleader exclusion may still lead to higher prices
when the smallest member takes a leading role provided that the ning structure
is nonlinear. Consequently, to prevent the potential adverse e¤ect of ringleader
exclusion, the above result suggests that an optimal antitrust punishment system
prescribes the imposition of nes proportional to rm size.
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Side-payments
Thus far, results have been derived for a given prot allocation scheme. However, it
is important to note that adopting a di¤erent prot sharing rule can be benecial
for the cartel. Provided that the ning structure is nonlinear, it may pay for rms
to reallocate prots so as to relax the tightest ICC. Specically, when the antitrust
penalty function is concave (convex) it can be protable to adopt a less (more) than
proportional prot sharing rule. One can imagine that this issue is more pronounced
with ringleader exclusion. For example, potential cartel members may be hesitant to
take a leading role under a discriminatory leniency policy and will only do so when
su¢ ciently compensated for giving up the right to apply for (full) immunity.
Indeed, in the analysis above we have compared a nondiscriminatory with a dis-
criminatory leniency policy under the assumption that there is a ringleader. Yet,
an alternative way of looking at the benchmark is that it describes collusion un-
der a discriminatory leniency regime absent ringleaders. This raises the question of
whether and when having a ringleader is benecial for all cartel members. Given the
proportional prot sharing rule, rm i 2 N has an incentive to become a ringleader
only when
(p   c)D(p) ki
K
  (1  l)F (ki) > (p   c)D(p)
ki
K
  (1  )F (ki): (2.6)
Observe that (2.6) is violated for all i 2 N when p  p. That is, if the presence of
a ringleader does not lead to higher prices, then none of the rms has an incentive
to take a leading role. In this case, however, assigning a ringleader may still be
protable provided that cartel gains are allocated properly. The question of interest
is therefore whether and when the presence of a ringleader generates a higher total
cartel value in comparison with the nondiscriminatory benchmark.
To address this question, note that the total collusive value absent a ringleader
is
V (p) =
(p   c)D(p)  (1  )Pi2N F (ki)
1  (1  ) ; (2.7)
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whereas the total cartel value with a ringleader is given by
V (p) =
(p   c)D(p)Pi2Nnflg kiK   (1  m)Pi2Nnflg F (ki)
1  (1  )
+
(p   c)D(p) kl
K
  (1  l)F (kl)
1  (1  ) (2.8)
=
(p   c)D(p)  ((1  m)
P
i2Nnflg F (ki) + (1  l)F (kl))
1  (1  )
There exists a prot division rule for which assigning a leader makes all rms better
o¤ when V (p) > V (p). Comparing (2.8) with (2.7) gives
V (p) > V (p)()
(p   c)D(p)  (p   c)D(p) > ((   l)F (kl)  (m   )
X
i2Nnflg
F (ki)): (2.9)
This condition reveals that whether or not side-payments are potentially benecial
essentially depends on the change in the cartels objective and the change in the total
expected antitrust penalty. Specically, notice that if assigning a ringleader has no
e¤ect on the cartel price, then (2.9) is satised only when the decrease in expected
discount for the ringleader is more than o¤set by the increase in expected discount
for regular cartel members. Moreover, the RHS of (2.9) is maximal for kl = k1 and
therefore is least likely to hold when the intended leader is the largest rm.
To gain some further insight, consider the extreme case where the ringleader and
all regular members but the rst to self-report are not eligible for leniency. Suppose
further that the applicant receives full immunity (i.e.,  = 1
n
, m =
1
n 1 and l = 0).
If p = p, then V (p) > V (p) only when the antitrust penalty of the ringleader is
lower than the average ne:
F (kl) <
P
i2N F (ki)
n
:
Thus, in this case compensation is a possibility when the ringleader is the smallest
rm and not benecial when the ringleader is the largest rm. In light of the empirical
ndings in Section 2.3, these results suggest that ringleader exclusion seems unlikely
to create adverse e¤ects by providing incentives to adopt more complicated prot
allocation rules. Ringleaders that have been identied in antitrust practice were
typically among the larger rms in the industry. Indeed, at least intuitively one
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would expect dominant rms to take a central position in the cartel. This also
holds with respect to cartel formation as larger rms have usually more to gain
from collusion. Furthermore, various empirical cartel studies show that bargaining
complexities should not be underestimated. For example, Levenstein and Suslow
(2004) state that Bargaining problems were much more likely to undermine collusion
than was secret cheating. About one quarter of the cartel episodes ended because of
bargaining problems. Bargaining issues a¤ected virtually every industry studied.
In sum, deviating from a simple and intuitive prot allocation rule is most likely
to be benecial when the intended ringleader is the smallest rm. However, evidence
from antitrust practice does not o¤er much support for this possibility.
2.4 Conclusion
In this study, we have sought to shed light on cartel ringleaders in relation to the
corporate leniency programme. Depending on the jurisdiction, a ringleader may
or may not be eligible to apply for leniency. As not much is known about cartel
ringleaders, we have rst conducted a survey of recent European cartel cases to
identify some common characteristics of ringleaders. The results of this survey reveal
that (i) there is often more than one ringleader, (ii) the role of ringleaders is diverse
and (iii) ringleaders are typically the largest cartel members. Our theoretical analysis
shows that ringleader exclusion can create adverse e¤ects. Specically, disqualifying
a cartel ringleader from obtaining leniency can lead to higher collusive prices when
(iv) the joint prot maximum is unfeasible under a nondiscriminatory leniency policy,
(v) antitrust nes depend on individual cartel gains in a nonlinear fashion and (vi)
the size distribution of members is su¢ ciently heterogeneous.
These results are driven by two main factors. The rst is quite general. In
comparison to a nondiscriminatory leniency regime, ringleader exclusion tightens
the ICC of ringleaders and loosens the ICC of regular cartel members. Given a
particular prot allocation rule, the magnitude of these changes determine whether
or not the cartel can sustain higher prices. The second is more specic. We have
assumed that collusive prots and expected antitrust penalties depend positively on
production capacity, which is taken as a proxy for rm size. This assumption nds
support in antitrust practice. Yet, it is potentially protable for a cartel to adopt a
more complicated prot sharing rule. In this respect, we have shown that assigning
a ringleader is most likely to create a higher total cartel value when the intended
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leader is the smallest rm. From a policy perspective, our overall ndings suggest
that it is optimal to impose antitrust penalties proportional to rm size when one is
willing to exclude cartel ringleaders from the corporate leniency programme.
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Chapter 3
An Experimental Study of
Ringleader Exclusion from
Leniency Programmes
Divide and rule, a sound motto. Unite and lead, a better one.
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1814)
3.1 Introduction
Leniency programmes o¤er a cartel member the opportunity to self-report its illegal
behaviour in exchange for non-imposition or reduction of antitrust penalties. These
programmes, initially established in the U.S. in 1978 and introduced to the EU in
1996, are nowadays widely considered to be an e¤ective means to ght cartels in both
antitrust jurisdictions. Although they share many similarities, leniency programmes
di¤er in their treatment of cartel ringleaders, which is the term commonly used for
a centralised decision maker that instigates or leads a cartel (cp. Ganslandt et al.,
2008; Hovenkamp and Leslie, 2011; Bos and Wandschneider, 2011 and most recently
Davies and De, 2013). Under the current U.S. leniency policy, and unlike to the EU
legislation, a cartel ringleader is not eligible for amnesty. This potentially evokes
substantial di¤erences in the rms conduct.
In this paper we discuss the impact of a ringleader exclusion regime on cartel
formation, prices and stability from an experimental viewpoint. The motivation for
our study is the general lack of understanding about which legal treatment is to be
preferred. Intuitively, arguments can be made both in favour of and against the
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U.S. exclusionary policy. On the one hand, exclusion makes the leader a trustworthy
partner in crime, which is likely to enhance cartel stability and foster collusion.1
On the other hand, the leader faces a higher expected ne and rms may abstain
from taking the initiative to lead, which in turn increases deterrence. Due to the
lack of a robust theory, it remains an open question as to which e¤ect dominates.2
The likely e¤ects of ringleader exclusion are further di¢ cult to evaluate by the use of
real world empirical testing, as the full population of deterred, detected or unknown
cartels are unobservable. This paper seeks to remedy these problems by analysing the
likely implications of both policy regimes in a simplied and controlled experimental
world.3
At the heart of the experiment is a market with three rms, competing in a
repeated Bertrand game with inelastic demand and zero marginal cost (cp. Dufwen-
berg and Gneezy, 2000). Firms can form a non-binding price cartel. However, such
a collusive act is illegal and, if detected, can result in antitrust penalties. The nov-
elty of our design is that we vary the possibility to self-report in exchange for a
discount on the antitrust penalties in a controlled manner. In the baseline condition,
which resembles the European leniency policy (henceforth labelled "EU"), all group
members have the chance to report. By contrast, in the treatment condition, which
corresponds to the discriminatory U.S. legislation (henceforth labelled "US"), we
restrict the ability to report to two group members. This design encompasses the
particularity of being a ringleader under the U.S. and EU legislation, and permits
to evaluate the impact of this asymmetry in the rmsreporting abilities on cartel
formation, pricing and stability.4
The study nds that a rmswillingness to engage in collusive misconducts does
not decrease when the ringleader is excluded from leniency. On the contrary, taking
into account that a cartel requires unanimous consensus of all three rms, the results
of this study in fact indicate that cartel formation may even be facilitated when
1On the correlation between trust and cooperation see for example Gächter et al. (2004).
2For a non-formal discussion of both e¤ects see Leslie (2006). More recently Herre and Rasch
(2009) and the revised version Herre et al. (2012) analyse the e¤ect of exclusion on cartel de-
terrence, while Bos and Wandschneider (2013) show that ringleader exclusion a¤ects both sides of
the incentive-constraints.
3The advantage of using experimental economics for researching competition policy designs are
discussed in Normann and Ru­ e (2011). Normann and Ricciuti (2009) assess the scope of laboratory
experiments for economic policy making.
4It has been established that subjects in asymmetric experiments take signicantly longer to
reach an equilibrium and that asymmetric markets are less cooperative. See for example Mason,
Phillips and Nowell (1992).
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the leader is not able to obtain leniency. It can thus be suggested that ringleader
exclusion is by no means a superior deterrence mechanism. The second nding of
this study is that, contrary to the previous literature, we did not detect any evidence
for higher prices in the exclusionary leniency regime. This can be seen as good news
for American consumers.
Finally, we observe an ambiguous e¤ect of ringleader exclusion on cartel stability.
With ringleader exclusion there was a signicant increase in the number of price
deviations, indicating a destabilising e¤ect of this policy. However, the reporting
rate of regular cartel members dropped, potentially jeopardizing the race to the
courtroom e¤ect that leniency programmes aim to create.
Overall, taking into account that antitrust authorities may benet in particular
from the self-reporting of the ringleader, as arguably ringleaders hold most of the
vital information that authorities need in order to successfully convict a cartel, our
ndings question the rationale behind excluding the cartel manager.
3.2 Related Literature
In recent years, there has been an interest in the optimal design of leniency pro-
grammes in both the theoretical (e.g., Motta and Polo, 2003; Spagnolo, 2008; Har-
rington, 2008) and empirical (Miller, 2009; Brenner, 2009) literature. Additionally,
to date several experimental studies related to leniency exist (e.g., Apesteguia et
al., 2007; Hinloopen and Soetevent, 2008; Hamaguchi et al., 2009; Dijkstra et al.,
2011). However, a common feature of these experiments is, that the experimental-
istsinterest has concentrated on quantifying the desistance and deterrence e¤ect of
leniency as compared to a laissez-faire or traditional antitrust environment, rather
than on the issue of ringleader exclusion.5 To our knowledge, only two experimental
studies address ringleaders. Bigoni et al. (2012a) investigate a variety of di¤erent
antitrust frameworks in a two player Bertrand supergame, including a preliminary
exploration of the e¤ect of excluding a ringleader from the reporting phase. They
maintain that excluding the ringleader has a small and insignicant e¤ect on de-
terrence, but leads to higher market prices and less price deviations. The limitation
of their study is, that leadership is implemented by treating the subject who rst
expresses the willingness to discuss prices (that is, presses a button on a computer
5Our decision to focus on the e¤ect of ringleader exclusion and not to compare our treatments to
a Laissez-Faire control or replicate existing ndings is in parts motivated by the copious existence
of experimental evidence on the overall e¤ect of leniency.
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screen) as the ringleader. In addition, their results rely too heavily on a duopoly
setting, which can be argued to be inherently more e¤ective in maintaining a col-
lusive agreement (cp. Huck et al., 2004). It would thus be of interest to learn how
ringleader exclusion a¤ects collusion in an oligopoly.
In an attempt to overcome the previous limitation, a recent experimental study
by Hesch (2012), which was conducted at the same time as this study, uses a three
player game with a similar structure to the leniency experiment by Hinloopen and
Soetevent (2008). Hesch identied that, given a low probability of detection, exclud-
ing a ringleader can stabilise the collusive agreement and lead to higher prices. The
author further maintains that the opposite e¤ect can be observed if the detection
probability is high. We would like to point out that a drawback of this study lies
in the modelling of the identity of the leader. The role of a ringleader is randomly
assigned each period, and therefore is not a conscious choice by the participants.
Subjects might hence anticipate leadership as an exogenous reduction in expected
payo¤s, rather than an endogenous decision.
This paper seeks to remedy this limitation by introducing a unique mechanism
to select the leader in an oligopoly setting. Our experimental design, which will be
described in the next section, is complementary to Hesch (2012)s experiment by
providing a meaningful role for the leader, so that subjects perceive its existence as
non-trivial, unambiguous and realistic. A cartel ringleader in our setting is the sub-
ject whose suggested cartel price during the communication stage has been accepted
by the two other group members. The novelty of this straightforward selection mech-
anism is that it ensures that the leader has a meaningful role: a leader is the subject
which eases the di¢ culties of coordinating on the contract surface (cp. Osborne,
1976).6
6In a strict sense, leadership is not entirely endogenous, as the computer randomly picks a
subject to make the rst price suggestion. However, every subject has the chance to make a price
suggestion which is rejected by the other subjects, and thereby the opportunity to avoid being the
leader. It is the ability of group members to coordinate that in the end denes the leader.
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3.3 Experiment
3.3.1 Experimental Procedure
The experiment was conducted in the laboratories of the Centre for Behavioural and
Experimental Social Science (CBESS) at the University of East Anglia. Subjects
were recruited from a large pool of university students via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
In total, 114 students from various backgrounds and nationalities participated.
The experiment was fully computerised using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher,
2007), and the order of all choice buttons was randomised. Upon arrival, subjects
were welcomed and seated in the laboratory at visually isolated computer terminals
in order to avoid communication between them. Subjects were provided with both
computerised and printed instructions, and were asked to read the instructions on
their own. A questionnaire was used to ensure understanding. After the question-
naire subjects could ask questions, which were answered privately by the experi-
mental supervisor. The presentation of the experimental instruction used a neutral
language to avoid inducing behaviour by framing; no terms such as "price", "cartel"
or "antitrust ne" were used throughout the experiment. However, for the sake of
better readability, we will use the corresponding Industrial Economics terminology
(e.g., "price" rather than "points") throughout this paper.
The experiment employed a ctional currency, labelled "experimental points",
which was converted to British pound at the end of the experiment at a rate of 3:5p
per point. Sessions lasted between 45 and 60 minutes including instruction time and
subjects earned on average £ 11.08, including an initial endowment of $4. At the end
of the experiment subjects were paid privately in cash. The maximum and minimum
payments were $28:73 and $4:62, respectively.
3.3.2 Experimental Design
The core of the experiment is a repeated homogeneous product Bertrand game with
zero cost of production as introduced by Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000). Subjects
play the role of a rm, which for 20 periods forms a market with two other randomly
selected rms. The triopolies are xed during the experiment and subjects have no
knowledge of the identity of their counterparts. In each period, rms simultaneously
and independently set integer prices that can range from 0 to 100. A buyer with a
reservation price of pmax = 100, who is simulated by the computer, then demands
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one unit per period from the lowest pricing producer. The rm setting the lowest
price earns a payo¤ equal to its price. In case of ties, the market demand is evenly
split among the tied rms.
Prior to setting their price, rms can form a non-binding price agreement. Only
if all three rms in a given market simultaneously choose to discuss prices, a cartel
forms and rms can communicate in a restricted manner about their price choice.
Price discussions come at the risk of an antitrust ne, which is levied upon the
rms by a computerised Antitrust Authority. In the period in which a cartel exists,
the Antitrust Authority has a 20% probability of discovering the agreement. As
described in more detail below, rms further have the possibility to self-report the
existence of a recent cartel in exchange for a reduction in their potential penalties.
Convicted rms pay a ne equal to 10% of their chosen price, irrespective of if they
are the lowest priced seller or not.7
We implement two treatments, corresponding to the two di¤erent legal frame-
works discussed in the introduction. Treatments are identical in every aspect apart
from their reporting stage. The rst treatment (EU) is our benchmark and re-
sembled the European leniency programme in which all rms can self-report their
cartel. The second treatment (US) tests for the e¤ect of excluding the ringleader
from leniency, and resembled the U.S. leniency policy in which all but the ringleader
can report.
In more detail, in every period the following 6 steps are implemented:
Figure 3.1: Game Tree.
Treatment
Manipulation
Collusion
Decision
Reporting
Decision
Final
Outcome
Learning  reporting and
detection
Exogenous
Enforcement
Price
Discussion
Price
Decision
Learning pricesLearning formation
Determination of
Ringleader
7Unlike Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008), we use a nite repose period in which rms can only
be penalised in the period in which they communicated. Cartels do not carry further into later
periods, so that rms had to decide whether or not to form a cartel at the beginning of each period.
Arguably, the lack of liability for pre-existing cartels is a limitation of our design. It was a necessary
simplication to avoid that subjects get confused over their liability, especially when a rm might
be the ringleader in one old and undetected cartel, but regular member in another one.
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1. Each rm simultaneously makes a binary choice to discuss prices. Individual
decisions of rms in the same market are then revealed. If all three rms within
a market want to discuss prices, communication takes place in a restricted
manner in the next step. Otherwise the game proceeds at Step 3.
2. The computer randomly selects one rm in the market to suggest a (non-
binding) cartel price. The two other rms can then either accept or reject
the suggested price. If the decision to accept is unanimous, the experiment
continues with Step 3. Else, the computer again randomly selects one of the
three rms to suggest a price. This procedure continues until an agreement is
reached or 2 minutes are over, in which case the experiment continues without
an agreed-upon price. In our analysis, we consider rms which discuss prices
as cartel members, even if no agreement is reached.8 A crucial element of this
stage is the selection of the ringleader, which is the rm whose price sugges-
tion is accepted by the other rms in the market. How the leadership role is
selected is common knowledge.9 In the "US" treatment, rms are aware that
the ringleader will later be restricted in its ability to obtain leniency in Step 4.
3. Each rm simultaneously sets a price from the discrete choice set f0; 1; : : : ; 100g.
Price agreements from Step 2 are non-binding. The rm with the lowest price
receives a net earning of p
L
points where L denotes the number of rm that
choose the same, lowest price. Any rm with a higher price receives no earn-
ings. Firms then learn the prices of the two other rms. In case a cartel exists,
the experiment continues with the next step. Else the experiment continues
with the Step 6.
4. Firms can self-report the existence of a cartel. We model leniency according to
the procedure used by Apesteguia et al. (2007), but to follow current antitrust
practice, which works on object rather than e¤ect, we ne every rm involved
in a cartel 10% of their chosen price, irrespectively if it has no revenues due to
price deviations by other rms.
Treatment "EU": In the "EU" treatment, all rms can report the cartel. If
8This notion of a cartel is common in the experimental literature. See for example Apesteguia
et al., 2007; Hinloopen and Soetevent, 2008; Hesch, 2012.
9We feel that this is a more natural selection than a random determination of the ringleader by
the computer as in Hesch (2012) or by a reaction task as in Bigoni et al. (2012a). The role of a
ringleader in the real world, amongst others, is to assist with price coordination (see Chapter 2).
This role is captured in our experimental design.
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only one rm self-reports, it gains immunity from nes. If two (three) rms
report, their ne is reduced by 50% (33%).10
Treatment "US": In the UStreatment, the leader is excluded from reporting.
If one member self-reports, it gains immunity from nes. If both members
report, their nes are reduced by 50%.
5. If no rm self-reports, a computerised Antitrust Authority may detect the
cartel with 20% chance.
6. Firms learn their nal earnings, whether the cartel is discovered and the number
of reporting rms (though not the individual reporting choice of each rm).
At the end of the experiment the initial endowment plus the number of points earned
in every period minus the penalties paid are converted into cash.
3.3.3 Hypothesis
The insights from the law and economics literature and the existing experimental
ndings o¤er some predictions that we can examine within our experiment. We
will test these hypotheses, described below, against the alternative hypothesis of no
di¤erence between our treatments:
Cartel Formation: Ringleader exclusion inuences the participation constraints,
which loosen for regular cartel member, as their expected ne is decreasing due
to less pressure to "race to the courthouse", and tighten for the ringleader. While
the overall e¤ect on deterrence is hard to predict, experimental evidence by Bigoni
et al. (2012a) nds no di¤erence in the rate of communication attempts, while Hesch
(2012) reports that with ringleader exclusion more rms are willing to join talks. As
expected nes fall for two of the three rms, our rst hypothesis is that the rate
10Our aim was to design a simple enough environment to guarantee understanding for our sub-
jects, while also keeping it much in line with the existing E.U. legislation, which embodies an upper
boundary of 10% of the sum of total annual turnover to the cartel ne. A 10% ne of rm revenues
is used in parts of the literature (Apesteguia et al., 2007; Hinloopen and Soetevent, 2008 and Hesch,
2012), while Bigoni et al., 2012a and Dijkstra et al., 2011 use a lump-sum ne. The 20% detection
probability slightly exceeds the estimation of cartel detection rates (13%   17%) by Bryant and
Eckard (1991). Previous experiments use either 10% (Bigoni et al., 2012a), 15% (Hinloopen and
Soetevent, 2008) or di¤erent probabilities for each treatment (15% or 75% in Hesch, 2012; 20%
probability of investigation and 75% probability of conviction (or the reverse) in Dijsktra et al.,
2011). We select 20% in order to ease mental accounting and understanding for our subjects.
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of communication attempts and the frequency of cartelised markets are lower in US
than in EU.
Pricing: For prices, both existing experimental studies nd higher prices. This is
in line with Leslies (2006) intuition that exclusion makes a suggested price more
credible, which should in turns enable rms to collude on higher prices. For this
reason, we conjecture that the conventional wisdom will hold and assume that prices
are higher in US than in EU.
Cartel Stability: Leslie (2006) argues that exclusion may stabilise cartels by boosting
trust between rms. This is experimentally conrmed by Bigoni et al. (2012a) and
Hesch (2012), who nd less price deviations (although no behavioural di¤erences
on reporting rates are reported). We predict that the frequency of reporting and
deviation is lower in US than in EU.
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3.4 Results
We present the results in three parts. This section begins by evaluating the e¤ective-
ness of both policy regimes at deterring cartel formation. The next section assesses
the resulting prices, and nally we take a closer look at the stability of the cartel
agreement. Unless stated otherwise, all non-parametric tests reported are two-tailed
and have been conducted at the group level to control for the non-independence of
observations within a market. 51 (63) subjects participated in the EU (US) treat-
ment, generating 17 (21) independent observations.
3.4.1 Cartel Formation
Our data yields information on the success of both policy regimes, EU and US, in
deterring cartel formation. In a rst step we analyse the rmsindividual intention
to form a cartel, which is indicated by the binary decision to communicate in Step
1. The evolution of the fraction of rms willing to do so over time is depicted in the
left side of Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Evolution of the fraction of rms (Left) and histogram of the
number of rms in a market (Right) who wish to form a cartel.
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Throughout the experiment a majority of rms in both treatments decide in fa-
vour of collusion. While slightly more rms are willing to discuss prices in the US
treatment (on average 65:16% as compared to 63:43%), the di¤erence between the
treatment is not statistically signicant (Mann-Whitney test, p > 0:10).11 Likewise,
11Potentially, the decision to attempt collusion is closely connected with experiences gained in
the previous periods, in particular the existence (or lack) of a cartel in the preceding period. Con-
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rms have no di¤erent intentions to communicate at the beginning of the experiment
- a proxy of ex-ante deterrence. The overall results indicate that, consistent with Bi-
goni et al. (2012a), deterrence does not increase when the ringleader is excluded from
leniency. This is conrmed in a regression analysis ( Table 3.1), which was used to
predict a rms decision to collude by means of a random e¤ects logit model. Ran-
dom e¤ects are introduced at the market (group) level to account for heterogeneity
in group composition. We use a dummy variable representing the treatment as well
as time variables and the Lagged Decision to collude. Further independent variables
are Lagged Deviation, a dummy taking value of 1 if the rm experienced a deviation
from the agreed-upon price in the previous period, and Lagged Reporting, a dummy
indicating whether the rm experienced self-reporting in the previous period.
In our notion a cartel is only formed when discussing prices is an unanimous
decision by the cartel members. We depict the number of rms per market which
agreed to discuss prices in the right side of Figure 3.2. What is interesting in this data
is that for both treatments the majority of cases is characterised by less than three
rms in a market being willing to collude. In particular, EU has the highest fraction
of all-but-one collusion attempts and the lowest number of unanimous decisions to
form a cartel. Of particular interest is the last column, which provides the frequency
at which rms achieve consensus to collude. Consistent with Hesch (2012), we nd
that ringleader exclusion leads to more established cartels (Mann-Whitney test, p <
0:01).12 Further analysis of the evolution of the fraction of formed cartels reveals
mild statistical evidence that much of the di¤erence stems from a higher rate of
cartel formation in the rst 10 periods (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0:06) while rates
do not di¤er in the second half of the experiment (Mann-Whitney test, p > 0:10).
In the next step we investigate the extend to which rms repeatedly form cartels,
which indicates the strength of a policy to deter recidivism. Across all markets, in
about one quarter of the cases a cartel was formed in the rst period, followed by
further collusion in later periods. The persistency with which rms attempt collusion
is illustrated in the left side of Figure 3.3, which provides the cumulative distribution
function (cdf) of the number of times a rm wanted to discuss prices.
sequently, we distinguish between observations in which rms competed / colluded in the previous
period. In markets in which no cartel existed in the previous period, rms show a 10% higher
willingness to form a cartel (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0:06). However, there is no statistically
signicant di¤erence between the two treatments.
12Note that the histogram is using group data from all periods, whiile we use the per group
20-period averages to compute the Mann-Whitney test statistic.
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Table 3.1: Random e¤ects logistic regression on the willingness to collude.
Dependent Variable: Willingness to collude Coe¢ cient
(Std. Error)
Constant 0.149
(0.280)
US 0.0598
(0.308)
Lagged Decision to collude 2.857
(0.141)
Period -0.0881
(0.0395)
Period2 0.00145
(0.00185)
Lagged Deviation -0.630
(0.287)
Lagged Leniency -0.977
(0.282)
Observations 2280
Note: This table presents the estimated coe¢ cients of a random e¤ects logit model where
the dependent variable is a rms decision to join a price negotiation. Random e¤ects
are introduced at the market level. Firms without ringleader exclusion are used as the
benchmark represented by the constant term.
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Figure 3.3: Cumulative distribution function of the number of times a
rm attempted collusion (Left) and of the agreed-upon price (Right).
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On average rms attempt to collude around 13 times in both treatments, but the
higher rate of formation results in more cartel participation: under the US regime
the average rm participates 7.19 times rather than 5.41 in a cartel.
The question remains on which price rms settle during the price negotiation
stage. The cdf of the agreed-upon price is shown on the right side of Figure 3.3. Of
the markets who formed a cartel, just over 70% agreed to charge the monopoly price
of 100. In one incident, rms agreed to set a joint cartel price of 1 to reverse from
a zero punishment phase in the earlier periods. In case the ringleader is excluded,
the average agreed-upon price is about 9 points lower than in the EU treatment.
However, no statistically signicant di¤erence in the outcome of the price discussion
stage was found (Mann-Whitney test, p > 0:10).
3.4.2 Prices
In this section we consider the impact of ringleader exclusion on prices, focusing rst
on the asking price, which is the average of the three prices in a market. To analyse
the development of the asking price, consider the left side of Figure 3.4 which plots
the average asking price for rounds with and without cartels. From the graph we
can see that there is no noticeable time trend in the data, and for a majority of
the rounds both prices in the EU treatment were higher than in the US treatment.
This nding is conrmed in the right side of Figure 3.4, which looks at the cdf of
asking prices. The cdf of US-Cartel rst-order stochastically dominates the cdf of
EUCartel, which indicates that collusive prices may be lower if the ringleader is
ineligible for leniency discounts.
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Figure 3.4: Evolution of asking prices (Left) and cumulative distribution
function (Right).
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Further analysis showed that the average asking price in the EU (US) treatment is
at 50.67 (51.10), with a median price of 41.61 (45.76). Further, prices within a cartel
are on average 50% higher than in competing markets, and are 8 points higher in EU
than US. Turning to statistical tests the di¤erence proves statistically insignicant
(Mann-Whitney test, p > 0:10). The price chosen by a rm was subjected to a
random e¤ects tobit regression analysis, whose outcome is presented in Table 3.2.
The dependent variable is the rms price in a given period. As before, we introduce
random e¤ects at the level of markets. Explanatory variables include three dummy
variables indicating whether a rm is in a cartel or competing in the EU or US
treatment, and a lagged regressor indicating the lowest price of the previous period.
To control for the experience in a cartel during the previous period, we used Lagged
Leniency, a dummy of value 1 if the rm experienced a leniency application in
the previous period, and Lagged Cheated Upon, a dummy variable equal to 1 if
a rm experienced undercutting of the agreed-upon price in the previous period.
The comparative benchmark consists of rms in competitive markets and without
ringleader exclusion.
Not surprisingly, rms set signicantly higher prices the higher the lowest price
in the previous period, and they respond to self-reporting or price deviations by
reducing their prices. The coe¢ cients of EU Cartel and US Cartel are positive and
signicant, indicating higher prices in cartelised markets. Testing the di¤erence in the
coe¢ cients with a 2-test reveals that the di¤erence is not statistically signicant
(p = 0:35). Further, in line with both Bigoni et al. (2012a) and Hinloopen and
Soetevent (2008), prices tend to decline over time.
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Table 3.2: Random e¤ects tobit regression on rmsasking price.
Dependent variable: Asking Price Coe¢ cient
(Std. Error)
Constant 41.60
(7.117)
EU Cartel 55.15
(3.208)
US Cartel 45.97
(9.487)
US Competion 1.960
(9.322)
Lagged Market Price 0.453
(0.0358)
Lagged Leniency -15.60
(2.590)
Lagged Cheated Upon -8.148
(3.805)
Period -0.829
(0.141)
Observations 2280
Note: This table presents the estimated coe¢ cients of a random e¤ects tobit model where a
rms chosen price is the dependent variable. Random e¤ects are introduced at the market
level. Firms in competitive markets and without ringleader exclusion are used as the bench-
mark represented by the constant term. There were 105 left-censored and 666 right-censored
observations.
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
In the next step we focus on the market price which is the lowest of the three
stated prices in a given market and period. Similar to our former discussion, the
average market price for collusive and competitive markets is plotted in the left side
of Figure 3.5. We note that market prices for markets in which a cartel has been
established are more dispersed. The average collusive price is 65.37 (58.13) in EU
(US) treatment, but the di¤erence is not statistically signicant.13 In line with our
13Three groups in EU and one group in US never established a cartel, leaving us with 14 (20)
independent observations.
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previous ndings, the di¤erence between prices of colluding and competing markets
for each treatment is highly signicant (Mann-Whitney test, p < 0:001). To gain
additional insights concerning the distribution of market prices, the right side of
Figure 3.5 depicts the cdf for collusive and competing markets. As the gure shows,
the majority of competitive (collusive) markets had prices in the lower (upper) end
of the price range.
Figure 3.5: Market prices (Left) and cumulative distribution function
(Right).
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3.4.3 Stability
To investigate the e¤ect of ringleader exclusion on cartel stability we rst consider
the defection rate, i.e. how often the agreed-upon price is undercut by one or more
cartel members. As can be seen in the second column of Table 3.3, a majority
of cartels breaks down due to price deviations. However, there is signicantly less
undercutting if the ringleader can apply for leniency (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0:09).
A likely reason for this nding is that in EU a ringleader can still punish deviation by
self-reporting, whereas he cannot do so in US.14 In other words, ringleader exclusion
destabilises agreements, as rms can deviate without the fear of punishment.
14The individual rate at which ringleader and regular cartel members deviate does not di¤er
signicantly.
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Table 3.3: Cartel Stability - Average (Std. Dev.) results per treat-
ment.
Treatment Deviation Reporting
...given own
deviation
... given rival
rm deviated
EU 52.17 (50.22) 80.86 (08.71) 42.03 (29.84) 88.52 (32.13)
US 62.91 (48.46) 43.87 (31.89) 25.35 (24.76) 80.35 (40.08)
Note: The rate of deviation is calculated using a dummy of value 1 if at least one
rm uncercut the agreed-upon price. The rate of reporting is calculated using a
dummy that takes the value 1 if a rm self-reports.
In fact, every cartel in EU had at least one rm reporting, while only 51:65% of
cartels in US got reported, and this di¤erence is highly signicant (Mann-Whitney
test, p < 0:001). However, reporting the fraction of cartels in which at least one rm
self-reported provides a biased picture because fewer rms (two instead of three)
were able to do so which naturally creates a lower fraction of reported cartels. To
control for this potential bias, in the next column in Table 3.3 we therefore report
how often a rm, which was able to report, did so. We nd that eligible rms in
EU are almost twice as likely to self-report than eligible rms when the ringleader
is excluded (Mann-Whitney test, p < 0:001). To analyse what drives this result,
we separate observations into rounds in which a rm deviated from the agreed-upon
price and then self-reported, and rounds in which a rm sticked to the agreement,
and self-reported to punish deviation by others. For the former, we nd that if a rm
deviated from the collusive agreement, it self-reported in 78:31% of the time in EU,
but only 43.85% of the time in US. In case other rms deviated from the agreement
while a rm sticked to it, that rm self-reported in more than 80% of the cases in
both leniency regimes. While this indicated the use of leniency as a punishment
device, there is no statistically signicant di¤erence between rms (Mann-Whitney
test, p > 0:1).
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3.5 Conclusion
Ringleaders are eligible for leniency in the EU but are excluded in the U.S. The study
was designed to determine the likely implications of this asymmetry on cartel form-
ation, prices and collusive stability. In a repeated three-rm Bertrand experiment
with the possibility of collusion, subjects were given the opportunity to self-report
cartels in exchange for a reduction in antitrust penalties. In one treatment, all sub-
jects were able to report, whereas the ringleader was excluded from reporting in the
other treatment. An important modication to previous studies by Bigoni et al.
(2012a) and Hesch (2012), who select the excluded rm by means of a quick reaction
task or a random draw, is the mechanism by which we implement the selection of
the ringleader. In our setting, the leader is the rm whose price suggestion has been
accepted as a collusive price by the other rms in a voting procedure. This ensures
that the leader is given a meaningful role in easing the cartel coordination problem.
A comparison of the two treatments of this study did not show any signic-
ant decrease in the rmswillingness to engage in collusive misconducts when the
ringleader is excluded. However, these results need to be interpreted with caution
as the intention to discuss prices does not necessarily mean that rms manage to
reach consensus and actually form a cartel. With respect to the actual rate of cartel
formation, our ndings are in agreement with Heschs (2012) ndings which showed
that actually more cartels are formed when the leader is not able to obtain leniency.
An interpretation of this result is that the decrease in expected nes for the two
regular cartel members weighs stronger than the increase in nes for the leader.
Instead of abstaining from leading a cartel, rms coordinate more often on collusion.
Another important nding concerns the e¤ect on prices. This study has been
unable to demonstrate that prices increase through ringleader exclusion as in the
duopoly setting of Bigoni et al. (2012a).
The third nding is that ringleader exclusion destabilises the collusive agreement,
as more rms deviate. A explanation for this might be that rms can deviate without
fearing punishment by the leader. However, we do not observe evidence of signicant
di¤erences in the way leniency is used to punish deviators. In fact, the only di¤erence
with respect to the reporting behaviour is that rms who deviated themselves self-
report more often if the ringleader can obtain leniency. Further research should
be done to investigate the cause of the increase in deviations. Especially on the
conditions under which a leader is needed to ease coordination seems an interesting
direction for future research.
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3.6 Appendix
Instruction
Welcome to this experiment about decision making.
If you have any questions throughout the experiment, raise your hand and wait till
the experimenter comes to your desk to answer the question in private.
You will form a group of three with two randomly chosen participants in this room.
You will not be told who the two other participants in your group are. Each group is
independent from others, and for 20 periods you will engage in the experiment with
the same two participants.
In each period you can earn Points. Each Point is worth 3:5 Pence. How many Points
you will earn depends on the decisions made by you and the others. You start with
an initial endowment of 4 Pound Sterling (GBP). At the end of the experiment, all
your Points will be converted into cash. If the experiment has to stop for any reason,
or your nal earnings are negative, you receive a showup fee of 2 Pound Sterling
(GBP).
Generally, the number of points you can win depends on the following:
You will have to select a number between 0; 1; 2; :::; 98; 99; 100. The participant who
chooses the lowest number earns points equal to this number. If more than one
participant chooses the lowest number, the points will be divided by the number of
participants who also choose the lowest number. The other participants earn zero.
Instructions
Each period consists of the following 6 steps, which are the same in every period and
for every participant:
Step 1: Every period starts with the question if you want to communicate with the
other participants about which number to set. However, note that communication
is prohibited and might lead to a penalty as described later. You can choose to
"Communicate" or "Not Communicate" by selecting the choice and clicking OK.
Only if all participants in your group wish to communicate, a communication screen
will open (Step 2). If not, the experiment continues with Step 3.
Step 2: You are equally likely to be selected by the computer to make a suggestion
which number to set. The other two participants can either "Accept" or "Reject" the
suggestion by clicking on the button. If both participants indicate that they accept,
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the experiment continues with Step 3. Else, the computer again selects one of you
to make a suggestion. This procedure repeats until you agree on a number, or until
2 minutes are over in which case the experiment also continues with Step 3. The
participant that suggests a number which is accepted by both members of the group
will have a di¤erent decision in Stage 5 as explained later.
Step 3: Each participant in your group must choose one number between 0,1,2,...98,99,100.
Step 4: In this step you learn the numbers set by all participants in your group.
If you communicated in Step 2, the experiment continues with Step 5. If not, the
experiment continues with Step 6.
Step 5: If you communicated in Step 2, and you have not been the participant
that suggested the number your group agreed on, you must decide whether or not
to report this. You can do so by clicking on the "Report" or "Not Report" button.
If you are the participant that has suggested a number which the other participants
agreed on, you will not have the option to report.
In case on or more group members report, each group member has to pay a penalty
equal to:
Penalty = 10 % of the number you have chosen.
This penalty will be deducted from the points you earned. However, in case you
report your penalty gets reduced as follows:
 If you are the only one to report, you will not pay the penalty but the others
will pay the full penalty.
 If you report and the other participant also reports, then your penalty is
reduced by 1/2. The remaining participant who suggested a number will pay his full
penalty.
Further, if neither you nor your group members report, the computer can detect that
you communicated, which leads to the point deduction penalty. The chance that the
computer detects your group is 20%.
Step 6: In this step you learn the nal amount of points you earned during the game.
In case you communicated in Step 2, you further learn whether this was detected
and how many participants of your group reported.
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End of Experiment:
The experiment ends after 20 periods. You will be paid at the end of the experiment.
The number of points you earned in each period minus the penalties you paid will
be converted into cash. You start with an initial endowment of 4 Pound Sterling
(GBP). If the points you earned minus the penalties you had to pay do not sum to
a positive number, you will need to invest your initial endowment. We guarantee a
minimum earning of 2 Pound Sterling (GBP). If it sums up to a positive number,
you will receive this amount in cash plus the initial endowment.
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Chapter 4
Antitrust and the Beckerian
Proposition: the E¤ects of
Investigation and Fines on Cartels
"Whatsoever evil it is possible for man to do for the advancement of his
own private and personal interest at the expense of the public interest,
that evil, sooner or later, he will do, unless by some means or other, in-
tentional or otherwise, prevented from doing it." Jeremy Bentham (1830)
4.1 Introduction
1A central task for antitrust authorities is to disincentivize and punish deliberate
infringements of competition law by imposing sanctions on detected wrongdoers. In
order to deter rms from engaging in criminal misconduct, a necessary condition
is that the expected cost of the illegal activity exceeds the economic gains from
participating in the same (cp. Ehrlich, 1973). As the economic gain, in general, lies
outside the direct control of antitrust legislation, policy makers are left with two ways
to increase the expected cost: they can either increase the likelihood of detection, or
they can increase the severity of the imposed punishment. In this study we examine,
by means of a market experiment, how the magnitude of the ne levied on a rm and
the likelihood of antitrust punishment a¤ect the choice to participate and engage in
a (illegal) cartel.
1This chapter is based on joint work with my supervisor, Subhasish M. Chowdhury.
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One can observe how antitrust authorities in di¤erent countries recently exper-
imented with nding an optimal punishment for antitrust law infringements. For
example, the O¢ ce of Fair Trading (OFT) in the United Kingdom, while facing a
5% year-on-year budget reduction that may well a¤ect their ability to commit re-
sources to costly investigations, increased the ne imposed on businesses in case of
an infringement of competition law (OFT, 2013).2 An implicit reasoning behind such
policy movement might be that the antitrust authorities economise on the cost of
enforcement by committing fewer resources to the detection of crime, while aiming to
achieve the same deterrence e¤ect through an o¤setting increase in the nes levied
upon wrongdoers. This relates to the prominent (but hitherto untested within a
market context) Beckerian Proposition, which, relating to crimes, states that the
magnitude and the likelihood of punishment are substitutes, as any o¤setting change
is supposed to achieve the same deterrence incentive.3
This implication of the Beckerian proposition for antitrust policy, phrased by
Kolm (1973) as "hang o¤enders with probability zero", is not uncontested. Block and
Sidak (1980), for example, argue against draconian sanctions as they may discourage
marginal deterrence (Stigler, 1970), lead to ine¢ cient overinvestment in private law
enforcement, and, most importantly, may lead to bankruptcy, which is harmful to
society.
This study contributes to the ongoing debate on optimal enforcement mechan-
isms, recently brought to the attention of the general public by The Economist (2012),
by exploring the Beckerian proposition with a market experiment.4 At the heart of
this study is a market with three rms, competing in a repeated Bertrand game with
inelastic demand and constant marginal cost (Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000). Firms
can form a non-binding price cartel. However such collusion is illegal and, if detected,
can result in antitrust penalties. We vary the probability of detection and the level
2Other jurisdictions in which changes in the ne levels are currently debated include the United
States, where on July 8, 2013 the American Antitrust Institute raised voice towards the US Sen-
tencing Commission to increase nes for antitrust o¤enses; and Germany where on June 25, 2013
the German Federal Cartel O¢ ce announced new guidelines for calculating nes that may lead to
higher nes.
3The rigorous economic analysis of law enforcement and deterrence begins with Becker (1968)
and is extended to risk-averse agents by Polinsky and Shavell (1979). Most recently Dhami and al-
Nowaihi (2013) use a non-expected utility framework and show that Beckersproposition holds under
rank-dependent utility and cumulative prospect theory. For surveys of the theoretical literature on
optimal law enforcement, see Garoupa (1997) and Polinsky and Shavell (2000).
4For the benets of a behavioral economic analysis of law see Jolls et al. (1998). Moreover,
Normann and Ricciuti (2009) and Hinloopen and Normann (2009) demonstrate how laboratory
experiments can be used for economic policy making.
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of the antitrust ne in a controlled manner such that the expected ne remains the
same. We additionally include two treatments, aiming to reect leniency programs
(Motta and Polo, 2003), in which we allow subjects to self-report the existence of a
cartel in return for a reduction in nes.
The main nding of this study is that the Beckerian proposition of the substi-
tutability of nes and detection rates may be supported in a market frame. As
predicted by theory, di¤erent combinations of ne and detection rates with equal
expected punishment achieve the same deterrence e¤ect. However, this is only true
in an environment without leniency. In the presence of a leniency programme, the
rate of rms favoring collusion is signicantly lower under low detection probability
and high nes. More importantly, a high ne and low detection rate under leniency
decreases the overall incidence of cartels, which is the ultimate aim of an anti-cartel
mechanism. One of the main contributions of this paper is that it provides empir-
ical support for the policy move orchestrated by the OFT. Finally we observe that
deviation and reporting rates are independent of high or low ne combinations and
similar results are achieved.
Using a market setting is important, as previous research has shown that a change
in the experimental frames may (e.g., De Angelo and Charness, 2012; Hoerisch and
Strassmair, 2012) or may not (e.g., Friedland, Maital and Rutenberg, 1978; Anderson
and Sta¤ord, 2003) provide support for the Beckerian proposition, and thus results
can not easily be transferred to the domain of antitrust infringement. Table 4.1
places this study in context with the previous work in this area of literature.
Initially, the Beckerian proposition has been investigated in the experimental tax
evasion literature. Friedland et al. (1978) increase either the tax rate or the ne level,
while audit rates change accordingly to guarantee a constant expected punishment
of tax evasion. Contrary to their theoretical expectations, they nd mild (but not
statistically signicant) evidence that larger nes tend to be a stronger deterrent
than more frequent tax audits. This nding appears to be a common characteristic
of experiments on tax compliance. In a review of the experimental results in this
area of research, Alm and McKee (1998) report the elasticity of tax evasion with
respect to audit rates at ranging from 0.1 to 0.2, while the elasticity with respect to
penalty rates is less than 0.1.
Block and Gerety (1995) use a sealed-bid auction in which subjects have the
opportunity to illegally communicate and coordinate their bids. They observe the
willingness to collude based on changes in either the ne level, the likelihood of
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detection, or both. Using students and prisoners as subjects, they observe that risk-
loving prisoners are more responsive to the detection rates, while risk-averse students
respond more to the ne level.
Anderson and Sta¤ord (2003) analyze the e¤ectiveness of punishment in a public
good experiment. For this, they incorporate a third party punishment for free-riders.
The authors vary the probability and severity of being punished, and allow for one-
shot or repeated interaction. Their results indicate that compliance is increasing
in the expected ne, and that a larger ne has a stronger e¤ect on compliance
than a higher detection probability. Most importantly, subjects do not consider the
probability and severity to be perfect substitutes. The marginal e¤ect of penalty is
about one third larger than that of the probability.
That an increase in the severity of punishment may exert a stronger deterrent
e¤ect than an increase in detection rate has also been shown in eld experiments.
Bar-Ilan and Sacerdote (2004) examine whether red light running decreases in re-
sponse to an increase in the ne, while detection probabilities are being held constant.
As predicted by theory, they observe a decrease in violations in response to an in-
crease in nes, with an estimated elasticity of the crime with respect to the ne of
0.20 to 0.30. In an earlier version of their paper,5 they further report results from a
eld experiment that varies the probability of detection while the ne level remains
constant. They report the estimated elasticity of red light running with respect to
detection likelihood as between 0.15 and 0.22.
Most recently, with another laboratory experiment, DeAngelo and Charness (2012)
conduct an experiment in which the expected cost of a speed-limit violation is being
held constant, whilst the probability of detection and the resulting ne are varied.
At the beginning, subjects are unaware of the enforcement regime. They then allow
subjects to vote on which regime will be enforced. Subjects prefer a high ne and
low screening regime. However, once subjects know which regime they are in they
do not behave di¤erently compared to the subjects in the alternative regime.
A direct experimental test of Beckers deterrence hypothesis by Hörisch and
Strassmair (2012) uses the context of stealing. Subjects play a mirrored dictator
game as in List (2007), in which they can steal from a passive player. Treatments
di¤er in the probability and ne level if stealing is detected. They nd that high
expected nes signicantly reduce the stolen amount; however intermediate expected
5The earlier (2001) working paper is entitled "The response to nes and probability of detection
in a series of experiments" and is available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8638.
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nes backre and increase the average amount taken. They further nd tentative
evidence that detection rate and ne level are interchangeable, which contradicts
some of the aforementioned experimental ndings.
To the extent of our knowledge, the relative e¤ectiveness of an increased likelihood
versus an increased severity of punishment in deterring illegal collusion has not yet
been studied in experimental work.6 Hence, conclusions regarding the applicability of
the Beckerian Proposition is mixed at the best. As a result, without specic tests no
denitive forecast can be made about the validity of the Beckerian Proposition in a
market context either. A market di¤ers from the frames employed in previous studies
in at least two dimensions. Whereas violating the law is a individual decision in areas
such as tax evasion, speeding or stealing, it requires a coordinated action in a market
setting. Further, no denite conclusions can be drawn from other frames, as policy
tools such as the ability to self-report in exchange for a reduction in nes (known as
the leniency programme) are unique to the market setting. The knowledge gained
from using a market frame is likely to guide both legal and economic discussions of
rule enforcement, and can help to achieve a richer understanding of how agents in a
market react to incentives, in particular in situations where violators of the law are
punished.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the
details of the experiment. Results are provided in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
6After conducting our experiment, we have been pointed at a recent working paper by Bigoni
et al. (2012b), who examine how leniency creates distrust among cartel members. To the extend
of our knowledge, it is the only experiment that varies detection rates and nes within a market
frame - albeit investigating a very di¤erent question and using a very specic setting with duopoly
producers of di¤erentiated goods and rematching throughout the experiment.
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Table 4.1: Related experimental literature.
Authors Frame Method Finding
Friedland, Maital and Rutenberg (1978) Tax evasion Variation in either audit rate or ne
with constant expected ne
Larger nes are a stronger deterrent
than frequent audits (although this is
not statistically signicant)
Block and Gerety (1995) Sealed-bid auction Variation in either detection rate or
ne, as well as o¤setting change in both
Risk loving (averse) subject are more
(less) responsive to a change in detec-
tion rate than in nes
Bar-Ilan and Sacerdote (2001, 2004) Red-light running Variation in either detection rate or ne
with constant expected ne
Elasticity of violation with respect to
increase in nes (detection) is between
.20 and .30 (.15 and .22)
Anderson and Sta¤ord (2003) Free-riding on Public
Goods
Variation in either detection rate or
ne, both with increasing and constant
expected nes
Marginal e¤ect of an increase in nes is
one third larger than of an increase in
detection
De Angelo and Charness (2012) Speeding Uncertainty over the detection rate or
ne. Subjects can vote for high (low)
detection and low (high) ne regime
Preference for high ne and low detec-
tion regimes. No signicant di¤erences
in speeding rates
Hoerisch and Strassmair (2012) Stealing Variation in detection rate and ne, in-
cluding treatments with same expected
ne
No di¤erence in deterrence for equal ex-
pected nes. Only high expected nes
deter
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4.2 Experiment
4.2.1 Experimental Procedure
The experiment was conducted at the Centre for Behavioural and Experimental
Social Science (CBESS) at the University of East Anglia (UEA). Subjects were 180
UEA students without prior experience in market experiments. We employed a xed
matching in which every subject was matched with the same other two subjects for
at least 20 periods. To avoid end-game e¤ects we implemented a random stopping
rule: at the beginning of period 21 and of each following period, there was a 20%
chance that the experiment stopped.7
The experiment consisted of two parts. In the rst part, run on pen and paper,
subjects took part in a risk elicitation task (Holt and Laury, 2002). A computerised
dice throw determined the outcome, but subjects did not receive feedback about
their earnings of this part of the experiment until the very end of each session. After
completing the risk elicitation task, subjects were provided with both computerised
and printed instructions (reproduced in the Appendix) for the second part of the
experiment (programmed and conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007)). A ques-
tionnaire was used to ensure understanding. Finally, after the experiment nished,
subjects were asked to ll out a demographics and feedback survey.
For the rst part, earnings were denoted in British pound. For the second part,
they were recorded in terms of experimental points, and converted to British pounds
at a rate of 15p per point at the end of the experiment. The average payment was
£ 11.41, including an initial endowment of £ 6 to cover potential losses. At the end of
the experiment subjects were paid privately in cash. Sessions lasted between 45 and
60 minutes.
4.2.2 Experimental Design
Our experimental design is a modied version of the cartel formation game in Gillet
et al. (2011). Subjects play the role of a rm with a constant cost of production
of 90. They face a repeated homogeneous-goods discrete Bertrand triopoly as in
Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000). In each period rms have to simultaneously decide
if they want to form a non-binding cartel. If all three competitors in a given market
7Dal Bo (2005) highlights the importance of a random-stopping rule to reduce opportunistic
behavior in strategic games, e.g. prisoner dilemma.
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decide to collude, they are informed that they mutually promised to charge the
highest possible price. Firms then simultaneously select a price p from the discrete
choice set f90; 91; :::; 102g, but are not obliged to set their agreed-upon price. The
rm charging the unique lowest price pmin earns the full market prot pmin   90,
while rms with a higher price receive no earnings. In case of ties, rms split the
prot evenly.
In all but one treatment, reaching a price agreement comes at the risk of an
antitrust ne, which is levied upon rms by a computerised Antitrust Authority. The
novelty of our design comes from the controlled variation of the likelihood of detection
and the magnitude of nes between the treatments. The detection probability can
be either low(henceforth indicated by a small p) or high(hereafter indicated by
a capital P). Likewise, nes can be either low(from now on indicated by a small
f ), or high(henceforth indicated by a capital F ). This allows us to experimentally
distinguish the deterrent e¤ect of nes and detection probabilities.
Further, two treatments allow rms to self-report the existence of a cartel in
return for a reduction in nes. This makes it possible to explore the robustness
in the presence of an important policy that is unique to a market frame. The so
called leniency programmeso¤er cartel members the opportunity to report their
illegal conduct in exchange for full immunity or a reduction of antitrust penalties.
Examining the validity of the Beckerian proposition with and without leniency does
also allow us to give policy advice for countries with antitrust enforcement, such
as Indonesia or the Philippines, that have not (yet) introduced a leniency policy.
Similiar to Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008), self-reporting costs one experimental
point. This is implemented in order to prevent rms to punish a deviating rm for
free. If a rm is the sole self-reporter, it gains complete immunity from nes whereas
the other rms have to pay the full ne. If two (three) rms report, their ne is
reduced by half (one-third). Fines in these treatments with leniency are denoted
with l and L, respectively.
In Table 4.2 we summarise the treatments:
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Table 4.2: Classication of treatments.
Probability Fine without Leniency with Leniency
10% 8
Low Detection rate, High Fine
(pF)
Low Detection rate, High Fine
(pL)
20% 4
High Detection rate, Low Fine
(Pf)
High Detection rate, Low Fine
(Pl)
0% 0 Baseline (B)
We assume an innite repose period in which the liability for the illegal collusion
lasts until the agreement has been detected or revealed by means of a leniency applic-
ation. This implies that a rm which stops colluding or deviates from its agreement,
can still be ned for its previous misconduct. At the beginning of each period of the
experiment, rms are informed whether or not they are liable for a previous agree-
ment. While rms can renew their agreement, they can not end a potential previous
liability.
The timing and information structure of the game is summarised in Figure 4.1:
Figure 4.1: Game Tree.
Leniency treatments only
Treatment
Manipulation
Learning formation
Price
Decision
Collusion
Decision
Reporting
Decision
Final
Outcome
Learning prices Learning reporting
and detection
Exogenous
Enforcement
1. Each rm expresses its willingness to reach an agreement over prices by select-
ing the appropriate button. If all rms in a given market wish to collude, they then
enter a non-binding agreement to choose the joint prot maximizing price of 102. If
at least one rm decides not to collude, then rms are informed about each rivals
choice and competition takes place in the market.
2. Each rm chooses its price from the set f90; 91; : : : ; 102g. Firms then observe
all prices in their market, and learn whether their price is the lowest submitted price.
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3. In the treatments with leniency, each rm can decide to reveal the existence
of a cartel at the expense of one experimental point.
4. If no rm self-reports, the cartel may still be detected by the Antitrust Au-
thority with the detection probability specied in the treatment.
5. In the last step, rms are informed about their nal earnings, whether collusion
was detected or not, and about the number (but not identity) of the whistleblowers.
At the end of the experiment, the number of experimental points earned in each
period minus the penalties paid is converted into cash. The earnings from the risk
elicitation task and the Bertrand game are then summed up and paid out in private.
4.2.3 Theoretical Framework
Across all treatments the competitive Bertrand equilibrium is to select a price of 91
with a competitive prot of comp = (91   90)=3: However, rms can coordinate on
prices above the competitive equilibrium by choosing to collude. The joint prot
maximizing price is 102, which yields per period collusive prots of coll = (102  
90)=3. Engaging in price xing comes at the risk of antitrust enforcement. Let 
denote the probability that a ne is e¤ectively imposed upon a colluding rm. We
chose  based on the estimation of cartel detection rates by Bryant and Eckard (1991),
who report rates between 13%-17%. Several previous market experiments used a
rate of 15% (Hinloopen and Soeteven, 2008; Gillet et al., 2011). We select 10% and
20% in order to ease mental accounting and understanding for the subjects, while
simultaneously selecting detection rates that can be observed in the real world. Once
a rmsengagement in an illegal cartel has been detected, the exogenous Antitrust
Authority levies a ne z upon rms. Set z =

4 if  = 20%
8 if  = 10%

, where the lowne
of 4 reects a rms one-shot prot from colluding, while a highne of 8 equals
twice the gain from colluding. It is important to note that the per-period expected
ne z is constant across treatments.
The net present value of the expected ne payments, given an innite repose, is
z+(1 )z+(1 )22z+ ::: = z
1 (1 ) . Finally, when collusion is enforced via
grim-trigger strategies, a deviating rm slightly undercuts the collusive price, and
gains a one shot prot of dev = 101   90, followed by reversion to the competitive
equilibria. The incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) for the Baseline is then:
4
1   > 11 + 
1=3
1   (1)
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Similarly, the ICC for a treatment absent leniency is given by:
4
1    
z
1  (1  ) > 11 
z
1  (1  ) + 
1=3
1   (2)
The left-hand side (LHS) of equations (1) and (2) consists of the net collusive
prot, which is the innite gain from collusion minus the expected ne payment,
whereas the right-hand sides (RHS) are the one-shot prot from deviation plus the
expected earnings from competition, minus the expected ne payment. Note that
the critical threshold for the discount factor in (1) and (2) is identical. As in the
framework of Becker (1968), the theoretical prediction would therefore not expect
any signicant di¤erences between the treatments pF and Pf. Furthermore, note
that in the presence of leniency, the optimal deviation strategy is to report at the
expense of creport = 1. The ICC for a treatment with leniency is then:
4
1    
z
1  (1  ) > 11  1 + 
1=3
1   : (3)
The LHS consists of the net gain from collusion, while the RHS consists of the
one-shot prot of deviation and reversion to competition, minus the cost of a leniency
application.
4.2.4 Hypotheses
Insights from the Law and Economics literature, existing experimental ndings and
the theoretical benchmark discussed above o¤er predictions that we can examine
within our experiment. The analysis will focus on three parameters: (i), we seek to in-
vestigate cartel formation, which can be measured by observing either the propensity
to collude (i.e., the rate at which rms favor collusion), or the actual incidence of
collusive markets. The null hypothesis, supported by our theoretical benchmark,
is that severity and probability of punishment is substitutable (Becker, 1968). In
our experimental setting, this translates that rms respond in the same way to an
increase in the likelihood of an enforcement action as to an increase in the severity
of the antitrust nes while keeping the expected ne the same. The alternative hy-
pothesis is that higher nes have a larger deterrence e¤ect (Anderson and Sta¤ord,
2003), both with and without a leniency policy in place. (ii), we consider the impact
on asking and market prices. In the theoretical benchmark, the parameters of the
enforcement regime do not inuence the prot-maximizing price. Our null hypo-
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thesis is therefore that prices do not di¤er between the treatments. Stigler (1970)
mentions that tougher punishment may well lead to a more severe crime. In a mar-
ket frame, a more severe crime means that a rm charges higher prices, as rms
aim to compensate an increased ne by higher gains from collusion (Jensen et al.,
2013). Our alternative hypothesis is therefore that prices are higher when nes are
large. (iii), we explore cartel stability, by observing how often rms within a cartel
deviate from the joint maximization price, and how often rms self-report in case
of leniency. As incentive constraints in our model are satised for all treatments, a
colluding rm should stick to a collusive agreement and not apply unilaterally for
leniency, independent of the detection rate and ne level. Our null hypothesis is
therefore that there will be no di¤erence between the treatments. We will test this
against the alternating hypothesis that there will be no di¤erence in the treatments
without leniency, but more self-reporting and deviations in pL than in Pl. We expect
this, because deviating rms will try to avoid high nes by reporting. In summary,
we have the following hypothesis which we test against the null hypothesis:
H0: There are no di¤erences between pF and Pf and between pL and Pl in terms
of (A) communication attempts and cartel formation, (B) asking and market prices,
(C) cartel stability.
H1A: With higher nes, rms are less likely to collude and there is a lower number
of cartelised markets, both with and without leniency: rpF < rPf and rpL < rPl:
H2B: Market and asking prices are higher in F and in L: ppF > pPf and ppL > pPl:
H3C: There will be more self-reporting and deviations in pL than in Pl.
4.3 Results
In synchronisation with the hypotheses, results are presented in three parts. Through-
out the paper all tests are performed with the entire sample, but restricting the ana-
lysis to observations from round 1 to 20 replicates the same results. We do, however,
use the restricted sample of 20 rounds to display dynamics over time, in order to
avoid misrepresentations caused by the unbalanced number of observations in later
rounds. Due of the dependency of observations within a market, the average statistic
of all three rms constitutes one unit of observation. 36 subjects participated in each
treatment; hence we have 59 independent observations.8
8One observation in pL had to be dropped, as two subjects went bankrupt.
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4.3.1 Cartel Formation
In this section we test whether combinations of detection rate and level of nes
resulting in equal expected nes are equally successful in deterring collusion, or
whether high nes act as a stronger deterrent (Hypothesis 1A). The experiment
allows us to answer this question by means of two key indicators of cartel activity
that are commonly used in the literature (Hinloopen and Soetevent, 2008; Gillet
et al., 2011; Bigoni et al., 2012a). The rst one is the propensity to collude - the
percentage of rms in favor of cartel formation.9 Our second indicator is the rate of
cartelised markets - the percentage of markets in which a cartel exists, taking into
account that undetected cartels carry over into later periods.
Propensity to Collude
In the rst step, we focus on the propensity to collude. Table 4.3 contains the
descriptive statistics. Not surprisingly, we note that in comparison with the baseline
treatment, all antitrust sanctions e¤ectively deter collusion attempts. Further, the
di¤erence in the propensity to collude across treatments in which an enforcement
regime is in place is statistically signicant (Kruskal-Wallis test, p < 0:01).
Table 4.3: Propensity to collude - Average (Std. Dev.) results per
treatment.
Probability Fine without Leniency with Leniency
10% 8 50.74 (19.03) 53.84 (10.42)
20% 4 49.74 (16.97) 64.67 (12.33)
Baseline: 76.69 (16.99)
Note: The propensity to collude is computed using the binary rm decision to
attempt collusion or not.
9To check for robustness, we also conducted similar analyses using more restrictive notions of
collusion attempts. In particular, we derived the propensity to collude using only observations from
periods in which a rm was not already liable for collusion. We further investigated periods in
which no cartel has been formed previously, and periods in which a previous cartel has been formed
but has been detected/reported. The results, available upon request, do not di¤er qualitatively.
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In order to get a grip on what drives the observed di¤erences, we focus on the ex-
istence (or absence) of a leniency policy.10 A comparison reveals that the propensity
to collude is about 9% higher in the presence of a leniency programme, and this is
statistically signicant (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0:04). This hints at the possible
pro-collusive e¤ect of leniency rst described in Motta and Polo (2003), according
to which rms use self-reporting as a punishment against defectors. Next, we turn
to a comparison of pF vs. pL and Pf vs. Pl, in order to test if the pro-collusive
e¤ect exists for both detection-ne ratios. A bivariate test yields no signicant dif-
ferences between the two treatments with low detection rate and high nes, but
collusion attempts are signicantly more frequent in the Pl than in the Pf treatment
(Mann-Whitney test, p = 0:03).
Our subsequent focus is on the second potential driver, i.e., the di¤erence between
the detection rates and nes. We pool pF and pL and compare them with Pf and
Pl. We do not detect any statistically signicant di¤erences (Mann-Whitney test,
p > 0:1), which would suggest that nes and detection rates are indeed substitutable.
However, as we showed that treatments with and without leniency di¤er in their
respective deterrence, we need to assess the substitutability of ne and detection
rates for each policy regime separately. Table 4.4 documents the p-values of pairwise
two-sided Mann-Whitney comparisons.
Table 4.4: Propensity to collude - p-values of pairwise two-sided
MWU-test.
pF Pf pL Pl
Baseline 0.0039 0.0016 0.0081 0.0325
pF 1.0000 0.6225 0.0646
Pf 0.7583 0.0282
pL 0.0488
Note:  p<0.10,  p<0.05,  p<0.01
10We also investigated the attempt to collude at the very rst period of the experiment, which can
be seen as a measure of pre-deterrence. There is no signicant di¤erence between the enforcement
regimes.
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The table can be read in the following way: First, we obtain no statistically
signicant di¤erence between the treatments without leniency. This is particularly
interesting, as it supports the substitutability of ne and detection rates to achieve
the same deterrence. However, the table also reveals that the di¤erence in the
propensity to collude between pL and Pl is statistically signicant (Mann-Whitney
test, p < 0:05). This nding is new to the experimental literature and questions if
Beckers proposition holds for markets regardless of whether a leniency policy is in
place.
To attain a more concrete understanding of a rms decision to favor collusion,
we now consider the evolution of the propensity to collude over time. The dynamics
of the fraction of rms that favor collusion are tracked on the left hand side of Figure
4.2, in which we have divided the time dimension into four blocks of periods. The
right hand side of Figure 4.2 depicts a histogram of the number of rms in a market
that were willing to collude. For the former, note that collusion rates tend to decline
mildly over time, with the exception of Pl which slightly converges towards the
Baseline. For the latter, note that in our framework cartel formation is a unanimous
decision: a cartel is only formed if all three rms expressed their willingness to
collude. We observe that treatments with leniency have the highest number of "all-
but-one" cases, which is in line with previous ndings by Hinloopen and Soetevent
(2008). Most importantly, the right hand side of the histogram depicts the rate at
which cartels are being formed (i.e. all three rms agreed to collude, regardless of
the existence of a cartel in previous periods).11 A pairwise comparison of the rate at
which cartels are being formed reveals no statistically signicant di¤erences between
pF and Pf, but the observed higher rate in Pl than in pL is mildly statistically
signicant (one-sided t-test, p = 0:05). Note that the lowest rate of cartel formation
is in the pL treatment, indicating that in the presence of leniency, high nes and low
detection rates seem most e¤ective in deterring cartels.
11Bigoni et al. (2012a) report the rate at which rms start a new cartel, provided they are not
already in an existing cartel. The equivalent rates in our experiment are: pF: 5.11; Pf: 5.66; pL:
7.36; Pl: 15.25. Restricting the analysis to observations without previous liability does not a¤ect
our results.
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Figure 4.2: Evolution of the fraction of rms who wish to form a cartel
(Left) and Histogram of the number of rms in a market that want to
collude (Right).
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The analysis so far is, however, not complete as we aggregated the individual
decisions in each market and hence did not fully explain which factors explain this
result at the rm-level. In the next step of our analysis, we therefore conduct a
regression analysis in which we treat each rm as a unit of observation in order
to better understand the behavioural forces that drive our initial ndings. The
model explains a rms individual decision to engage in a cartel by means of a
dynamic random intercepts logit model where the dependent variable is the binary
choice to attempt collusion. To account for potential random disturbances caused
by the group composition, we employ the random e¤ect at the level of markets. In
addition to treatment dummies, we dene a period and period-squared variable to
correct for a potential trend over time. Independent variables further include the
lagged decision to collude in the previous period (Decision to colludet 1), a dummy
indicating whether or not a cartel has been successfully formed in the previous period
(Cartel formed t 1) and a dummy indicating whether a cartel has been detected
(Cartel detected t 1) or reported (Cartel reported t 1) in the previous period. Further,
we use a dummy which takes the value 1 if a cartel existed in the previous period
and at least one member deviated from the optimal cartel price by charging a price
below the collusive one. In a further set of estimations we also add other variables. In
model 2, we control for individual risk preferences by including the number of risky
choices that were made during the Holt and Laury task, as well as a dummy variable
(Inconsistent preferences) to control for subjects that expressed inconsistent risk
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attitudes by switching more than once between the safe and risky lottery option.12
Finally, in model 3 we use the number of times a rm has so far been involved in
a cartel, as well as the number of times its engagement in a cartel was detected or
reported, as alternative explanatory variables. Table 4.5 displays the results of the
regressions.
For the regressions in the three columns on the left-hand side, the pF treatment
is used as a benchmark, represented by the constant term. On the right-hand side,
we use the pL treatment as our benchmark in order to investigate the e¤ect of a
di¤erent detection-ne regime given the presence of a leniency programme. The
logit regression conrms our initial results from the non-parametric analysis. The
coe¢ cient of the treatment dummy Pf is not statistically signicant, indicating no
di¤erence in deterrence, while the estimated coe¢ cient Pl is of positive sign and
signicant at the 5% level. With respect to the other variables, we make the following
observations. First, there is strong evidence that the previous periods decision to
collude, represented by the Decision to colludet 1 dummy, is an important factor
for the current decision. Second, we do not obtain a statistically signicant e¤ect
of time between the treatments. Whether or not a price deviation occurred in the
previous period also seems irrelevant. As undetected cartels carry over into the next
periods, having formed a cartel in the previous period negatively a¤ects the odds to
decide to collude. Further, experiencing an antitrust action has a deterrence e¤ect
by reducing the odds to collude. Cartel formed t 1 and Cartel detected t 1 does not
turn signicant in the regressions with leniency. The size and sign of the coe¢ cient
Cartel reported t 1 indicate that experiencing self-reporting rather than exogenous
detection is among the main factors that inuence a rms decision not to collude
again.13
12Controlling for socio-demographic characteristics such as age, gender and nationality does not
a¤ect the sign or signicance of the estimated coe¢ cients.
13While controlling for risk preferences does not change the sign or statistical signicance of
the previously mentioned coe¢ cients, risk choice turns out signicant in the comparison of the
treatments without leniency, but not in the comparison with leniency. We o¤er a possible behavioral
explanation for this nding in the Discussion section of this paper.
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Table 4.5: Random e¤ects logistic regression on the decision to collude.
without Leniency (Base: pF) with Leniency (Base: pL)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Decision to collude
Constant -1.216 -1.898 -2.153 -1.309 -1.386 -1.609
(0.302) (0.335) (0.334) (0.288) (0.309) (0.299)
Pf 0.0411 0.165 0.236
(0.250) (0.271) (0.281)
Pl 0.381 0.376 0.314
(0.170) (0.169) (0.146)
Decision to colludet 1 2.933 2.766 2.582 3.571 3.563 3.179
(0.139) (0.142) (0.132) (0.163) (0.163) (0.142)
Period -0.00630 -0.00995 0.0321 -0.0166 -0.0182 0.0129
(0.0390) (0.0394) (0.0412) (0.0446) (0.0446) (0.0449)
Period2 -0.000646 -0.000591 -0.00115 -0.000307 -0.000249 -0.000566
(0.00140) (0.00141) (0.00141) (0.00164) (0.00165) (0.00161)
Cartel formedt 1 -0.764 -0.640 0.648 0.859
(0.220) (0.233) (0.580) (0.595)
Cartel detectedt 1 -0.625 -0.617 -0.298 -0.425
(0.288) (0.303) (0.480) (0.487)
Cartel reportedt 1 -2.278 -1.674
(0.583) (0.686)
Price deviationt 1 -0.0355 -0.0870 -0.908 -0.891
(0.174) (0.181) (0.583) (0.586)
Risky choices 0.159 0.168 0.0321 0.0248
(0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0291) (0.0273)
Inconsistent preferences -0.251 -0.279 -0.209 -0.0940
(0.241) (0.242) (0.205) (0.185)
# of times busted -0.257 -0.409
(0.163) (0.151)
# of times colluded -0.0216 0.320
(0.0228) (0.129)
Observations 1710 1710 1710 1524 1524 1524
Standard errors are in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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To include both xed (at the rm) and random e¤ects (at the market level), we
further run an alternative random-intercept logistic regression, using a Generalized
Linear Latent and Mixed model (Rabe-Hesketh et al., 2005). GLAMMhas previously
been used in similar statistical analyses by other researchers, including Bigoni et
al. (2012a), to account for correlations between observations from the same rm,
and from di¤erent rms belonging to the same market. The estimates conrm the
robustness of our results from our logit model, and are reported in the Appendix.
We thus summarise our ndings in the following statement:
Result 1: Propensity to Collude
Absent leniency, ne and detection rate are substitutes with respect to their de-
terrence. When leniency exists, a lower detection probability and higher ne regime
is signicantly stronger in deterring rms to favor collusion than a higher detection
and lower ne regime.
Cartelised Markets
Of greater interest than the e¤ects of di¤erent policy regimes on collusion attempts
is whether any policy regime is more successful in reducing the actual incidence
of cartels. We address this question by observing the number of cartelised markets,
meaning markets at which a cartel agreement was in place at the price decision stage.
The LHS of Figure 4.3 depicts the average fraction of collusive markets aggregated
over all periods, and highlights the relative e¤ectiveness of each treatment in reducing
the occurrence of cartels.
Figure 4.3: Average fraction of cartelised markets (Left) and the dynamics
over all periods (Right).
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As can be seen, antitrust regimes di¤er greatly in the resulting number of car-
telised markets. We nd that with antitrust enforcement between 8:27% and 44:69%
of all markets are cartelised, while in a laissez-faire environment 9 out of 10 markets
are collusive. At a rst glance, the table also reveals that the rate varies along two
dimensions. There seem to be fewer cartels with than without leniency, and there
seems to be a di¤erence between low ne and high detection and high ne and low
detection regimes. Particularly interesting is the opposite trend between the latter:
While our results indicate less cartels for high detection rates and low nes absent
leniency, the opposite pattern emerges with leniency. The di¤erence in the percent-
age of cartelised markets across treatments with antitrust enforcement is statistically
signicant (Kruskal-Wallis test, p = 0:04).We compare pF vs. Pf and pL vs. Pl in
order to test for the substitutability of detection rate and sanctions with and without
leniency. We nd support for Becker (1968), as we cannot reject our null hypothesis
of equal population means for low detection rates and high nes without leniency
(Mann-Whitney test, p = 0:56). However, there is mild evidence that a higher ne
and lower detection regime reduces the number of cartelised markets in the presence
of leniency (one-sided t-test, p = 0:04) which again questions the general validity of
the Beckerian proposition.
To complete the analysis, we now turn to a graphical representation of the e¤ects
of di¤erent policy regimes on the rate of cartelised markets. The RHS of Figure 4.3
depicts the fraction of cartelised markets over time as observed in our data. The
gure reveals that at any moment in time, fewest cartels were operating in the pL
treatment, followed in order by Pl and the two treatments without leniency. We can
now present our second result:
Result 2: Cartelised Markets
Absent leniency, ne and detection rate are substitutes with respect to the occurrence
of cartels. When leniency exists, a lower detection probability and higher ne re-
gime is signicantly stronger in reducing the number of active cartels than a higher
detection and lower ne regime.
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4.3.2 Prices
The analysis so far has very much focused on the participation in the cartel, although
a change in the level of nes and detection rates might also a¤ect the price that
colluding rms charge. An Antitrust Authority that cares about consumer welfare
will try to achieve lower prices as a result of a change in the enforcement regime, or
at least it will try to prevent an increase in prices.
How a wrongly designed enforcement regime can provide incentives to commit
a more severe crime was rst discussed by Stigler (1970), and has recently been
explored by Jensen et al. (2013). They show in a theoretical model that rms might
react to higher nes by increasing their prices. In this subsection, we compare the
resulting prices (and hence consumer welfare) under each antitrust regime. We ask if
higher nes and lower detection probabilities diminish consumer welfare (Hypothesis
2B).
Asking Prices
One may argue that the experimental design allows rms to tacitly collude to avoid
detection, which would make it impossible to discuss consumer welfare. If rms were
indeed tacitly colluding, one would expect no signicant di¤erence between asking
prices within and outside of a cartel. We start to address this by investigating the
asking price, the average of the three stated prices in a given market in a particu-
lar period. Table 4.6 yields the asking prices for all treatments, and distinguishes
between the price charged in rounds with and without a cartel.14 At a rst glance,
three main insights emerge from that table. Prices do not appear di¤erent when
varying detection probability and magnitude of nes, but they appear higher in
collusive than in competitive markets. Furthermore, it is not obvious if prices are
substantially di¤erent given the presence or absence of a leniency policy.
14Arguably, subjects will self-select into collusive and competitive markets. A pairwise compar-
ison of asking prices without distinguishing between collusive and competitive markets reveals no
statistically signicant di¤erence between prices with leniency. Absent leniency, prices are higher if
nes are high and detection rates are low.
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Table 4.6: Average (Std. Dev.) asking price per treatment.
Collusive Competitive
Probability Fine
without
Leniency
with
Leniency
without
Leniency
with
Leniency
10% 8 95.75 (2.90) 97.89 (2.10) 93.81 (1.92) 92.56 (1.59)
20% 4 95.66 (2.11) 98.06 (2.90) 92.36 (0.86) 93.01 (1.08)
Baseline: 96.23 (2.69) 95.96 (2.44)
Note: Asking prices are calculated using the average of the three stated prices in a
market.
It is important to notice that there exists a clear gain from colluding, as asking
prices are between 3 and 4 points higher in collusive than in competitive markets.
These ndings appear all the more remarkable as the gain from colluding exists
even though the cartel agreement was not binding, and no actual communication by
means of, for example, a chat took place. Further, we observe that asking prices from
competitive markets are not statistically di¤erent across treatments (Kruskal-Wallis
test, p > 0:1). This is intuitive, as absent collusion rms face identical decisions
across our treatments. There is however mild statistical evidence that asking prices
are di¤erent for collusive markets (Kruskal-Wallis test, p = 0:09). This in fact
supports the ndings of Bigoni et al. (2012a), who report statistically higher prices
inside, but not outside of cartels. The di¤erence can be visualized when we compare
the price dynamics over time. Figure 4.4 depicts the per-period average asking
prices for collusive and competitive markets. The gure reveals a tendency for more
dispersed prices in collusive markets, while prices in competitive markets move almost
parallel with little di¤erences over time.
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Figure 4.4: Asking prices for collusive (Left) and competitive markets
(Right).
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Turning to statistical tests, for which we focus only on collusive markets, we
compare the asking price with and without leniency. We nd that asking price are
about 2 points higher in the presence of leniency, and this di¤erence is statistically
signicant (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0:01). Higher cartel prices in treatments with
leniency are also reported in Bigoni et al. (2012a), who emphasize that in the presence
of a leniency programme rms undercut the agreed-upon price and self-report. Hence
they reason that any punitive price-war will occur in competitive markets, while
absent leniency the price war might take place within the cartel. A similar reasoning
can be applied to our experimental design, which may articially inate prices in
treatments with leniency.
In the next step, we check if this e¤ect of leniency also exists independent of the
ne-detection ratio. We nd no statistically signicant di¤erence between the asking
prices pF and pL, but for high detection rates and low ne there is mild evidence of
a statistical di¤erence between Pf and Pl (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0:08). A more
detailed comparison shows that the di¤erence between low detection rates and high
detection rates is neither statistically signicant for pL vs. Pl, nor for a comparison
between pF and Pf. In other words, our analysis provides no statistical support for
the suggestion that rms react to higher nes by raising their asking prices. We have
to conclude that ne and detection ratios are indeed substitutable with respect to
their e¤ect on asking prices. We summarise that there is no statistically signicant
di¤erence in the asking price across treatments.
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Market Prices
To complete the analysis, let us now examine the market price, i.e., the lowest price
charged by any rm in a market. Similar to our analysis of asking prices, Table 4.7
yields the market prices for all treatments, di¤erentiated between the price charged
in rounds with and without a cartel. We make the following two observations. First,
market prices in collusive markets are about 3 points above the prices in competitive
markets. This seems to support the gain from collusion that we identied previously.
Second, di¤erent enforcement regimes have essentially no e¤ect on market prices in
competitive markets. Prices absent collusion are close to the theoretical Bertrand
equilibrium. Furthermore, the prices in collusive markets are about 8 points below
the joint prot maximizing price which indicates the existence of price deviations.
Table 4.7: Average (Std. Dev.) market price per treatment.
Collusive Competitive
Probability Fine
without
Leniency
with
Leniency
without
Leniency
with
Leniency
10% 8 93.82 (3.25) 94.61 (3.11) 91.56 (0.90) 91.33 (1.20)
20% 4 93.04 (1.99) 95.47 (4.37) 91.20 (0.32) 91.29 (0.68)
Baseline: 94.32 (2.68) 93.62 (1.25)
Note: Market prices are calculated using the minimum of the three stated prices in
a market.
In a further Kruskal-Wallis test we nd that prices in cartel groups may appear
more dispersed than in competitive markets, but there is no statistically signicant
di¤erence between either of them (p > 0:1).15 A pairwise comparison using Mann-
Whitney tests in a similar manner as in our previous analysis conrms this. Sum-
marising, we observe no statistically signicant evidence that suggest any validation
of the claim that policy regimes will inuence the severity of the committed crime.
The above mentioned regularities becomes easily recognizable in Figure 4.5, which
reports the evolution of market prices over time, both for collusive and competitive
markets.
15This result holds also for a pairwise comparison of market prices without distinguishing between
collusive and competitive markets.
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Figure 4.5: Market prices for collusive (Left) and competitive markets
(Right).
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The observed patterns over time broadly support our initial intuition. We can
thus present our third result:
Result 3: Prices
With a constant expected ne, irrespectively of the presence of a leniency programme,
asking and market prices remain the same.
To assess which policy regime is to be favored from a consumers point of view, we
further investigated the average consumer welfare, which is dened as the di¤erence
between the maximum willingness to pay of 102 and the actual market price. It is
not immediately clear whether or not a leniency programme is welfare improving
(Kruskal-Wallis test, p > 0:1). In pairwise comparisons of pF and Pf to pL and Pl,
we nd no signicant di¤erence.
4.3.3 Stability
In the nal analysis we focus on successfully formed cartels in order to understand
how they achieve prices above the competitive equilibrium. Specically, we investig-
ate defection and self-reporting, which can be understood as a proxy for the internal
stability of a cartel. We measure defection by the percentage of rms within a car-
tel which select a price below 102 and hence deviate from the agreement. Table 4.8
provides the average defection rates for each treatment.
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Table 4.8: Price Deviation - Average (Std. Dev.) results per treat-
ment.
Probability Fine without Leniency with Leniency
10% 8 69.84 (27.70) 57.14 (18.35)
20% 4 74.54 (20.92) 53.78 (31.05)
Baseline: 66.97 (23.83)
Note: The rate of price defections (conditional on the existence of a cartel) is calcu-
lated using a dummy that takes the value 1 if a rm in a cartel chose a price below
102.
A rst point to notice is that defection rates vary across treatments (Kruskal-
Wallis test, p = 0:09). Firms undercut the agreed upon price more rigorously in
the absence of leniency. In fact, the rate of price deviations is about 17% lower for
the two leniency treatments, and this di¤erence is statistically signicant (Mann-
Whitney test, p = 0:02). This nding is not surprising, as it has been often argued
that rms can utilise the leniency programme to punish deviators with reporting.
Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008) report that the agreed-upon price is undercut in
97% of the cases with leniency, as compared to 75% without leniency.
Of greater interest is the di¤erence between pF and Pf, and between pL and Pl,
which both are statistically not signicant (Mann-Whitney test, p > 0:1). However,
it is important to note that only about 9% of all markets in the pL treatment had
a cartel. The number of observations that we can use for statistical tests is hence
rather limited, so that we may lack the power necessary to nd signicant di¤erences.
Now focus on the use of the leniency programme by self-reporting, by which we
mean that a rm reveals the existence of a cartel at the expense of one point, in order
to avoid the possibility of antitrust nes.Remember however that self-reporting does
not guarantee full immunity from nes. Similar to the design of leniency programmes
in the experimental literature so far, a reporting rm may still pay a (reduced) ne if
more than one rm reports the cartel. Table 4.9 contains the average reporting rates
for each treatment.16 The rate of self-reporting using all observations is reported on
the left side, while the right side of Table 4.9 provides the rate of self-reporting using
16Alternatively, we can observe the fraction of established cartels that end due to reporting. In
our pL treatment, 95:23% of the established cartels had at least one whistleblower, compared with
82:88% in PL. While on a rst view these rates appear extremely high, they are not too di¤erent
from the 78% reported in Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008).
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only observations where a rm either deviated itself, or experienced a deviation from
another cartel member.
Table 4.9: Reporting - Average (Std. Dev.) results per treatment.
Probability Fine Reporting
...given own
deviation
... given rival
rm deviated
10% 8 54.34 (11.55) 34.12 (09.31) 53.17 (11.50)
20% 4 56.52 (30.10) 37.71 (26.66) 54.35 (32.26)
Note: The rate of reporting is calculated using a dummy that takes the value 1 if a
rm liable for a cartel self-reports.
We observe no statistically signicant di¤erence between the two treatments with
leniency (Mann-Whitney test, p > 0:1). While this does not allow us to reject our null
hypothesis in support of the alternative hypothesis H3C, we need to be aware that
very few markets in pL are cartelised and that this limits the number of observations
that we can draw conclusions from.
To investigate if rms use the leniency programme as part of a deviation strategy,
we test for the percentage of cartel members that self-report after they have devi-
ated from the collusive price. 34:12% and 37:71% of rms in pL and Pl use this
strategy. Next, we are interested if rms self-report to punish deviators. Indeed
53:17% (54:35%) of rms in pL (Pl) report after deviations by others (conditional
on sticking to the collusive agreement themselves). This pattern indicates that rms
use the leniency programme more often to punish deviators, than as part of their
own deviation strategy.
However, as the di¤erence between all observations is not signicant we conclude:
Result 4: Stability
Firms deviate less often in the presence of leniency, and report more often if nes
are low. However, rates do not di¤er signicantly between di¤erent detection-ne
combinations.
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4.4 Conclusion
We experimentally examine the Beckerian Proposition, according to which di¤erent
combinations of the magnitude and the likelihood of punishment achieve the same
deterrence e¤ect. This key principle to the Law and Economics literature has been
supported in existing laboratory experiments on speeding and stealing, but not in
other experimental frames such as free-riding and tax evasion. The ambiguous evid-
ence makes it di¢ cult to draw conclusions for the design of optimal law enforcement
mechanisms by antitrust authorities, who face a trade-o¤ between economizing on
costly enforcement actions and the potential adverse e¤ects of a higher ne rate.
Criminal activities in a market frame di¤er from all previously studied situations,
as the violation of antitrust laws is a coordinated rather than an individual action.
Further, enforcement agents can utilise other policy tools such as leniency to disin-
centivize and punish wrongdoers. To date it is therefore unclear how rms will react
if authorities vary either the likelihood of detection or the level of nes, but keep the
expected nes constant. This experiment closes this gap by experimentally varying
the probability of detection and the amount of antitrust nes in a repeated Bertrand
game with inelastic demand and exogenous antitrust enforcement.
Based on the data retrieved from the experiment, we nd that in general nes and
detection rates may indeed be treated as substitutes. It is reassuring that, as pre-
dicted by theory, di¤erent combinations of the magnitude and likelihood of punish-
ment seem to be interchangeable instruments to deter cartels. However, in addition
to demonstrating that the Beckerian proposition can hold in a market frame, we also
have clear indication that the deterrence e¤ect of punishment is not maintained if a
leniency policy exists. In the presence of leniency, a lower detection probability with
higher nes signicantly reduces the rate of rms which attempt to form a cartel.
More importantly, a high ne and low detection policy under leniency decreases the
overall incidences of cartels, which is the ultimate aim of a deterrence mechanism.
We nd e¤ect of di¤erent detection-ne combinations in terms of asking and market
prices. Finally, we observe that no ne-detection regime is signicantly superior in
terms of its destabilization of cartels.
From a policy point of view, the experimental study has an important implication.
The results indicate that society can not just economise on costs of enforcement, as
postulated by Becker (1968), but actually achieve greater deterrence at lower costs.
Consequently, the results give empirical support for the policy move towards higher
nes as orchestrated recently by the OFT or suggested by Germany and the US.
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Two immediate questions arise: First, why does the Beckerian proposition hold
absent leniency, but not when a leniency policy exists? And second: if detection rate
and ne are not substitutable, why do we observe stronger deterrence in pL than in
Pl?
A possible answer to these questions is that rms may assume a di¤erent like-
lihood of detection when a leniency programme exists. While absent leniency the
perceived detection probability is the exogenous given probability and hence no
statistically signicant di¤erence between pF and Pf exists - the perceived detection
probability with leniency is a combination of the exogenous detection rate and the
belief that other rms may self-report. The likelihood that another rm self-reports
may well depend on the ne levels, as higher (lower) nes provide more (less) in-
centives to self-report, all else equal. If for high nes the perceived likelihood of
detection is greater than the exogenous likelihood, this implies that rms perceive
the expected ne as greater than the combination of exogenous detection and ne
level. Contrary, for low nes rms are less likely to self-report, which reduced the
perceived detection probability and may explain our results.
An interesting direction for future research is whether rms anticipate higher
nes, and react by wastefully spending resources on avoidance activities as proposed
by Malik (1990). This idea has recently been investigated by Bayer and Sutter
(2009) in the frame of tax evasion, but has not yet been tested for a market frame.
This could be investigated in a similar experimental study, which we leave for future
research.
77
4.5 Appendix
Table 4.10: Random intercept logistic regression on the decision to col-
lude.
Dependent variable: Decision to collude without Leniency (Base: pF) with Leniency (Base: pL)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant -1.234 -1.954 -2.228 -1.313 -1.386 -1.610
(0.294) (0.304) (0.300) (0.289) (0.309) (0.299)
Pf 0.0601 0.233 0.355
(0.230) (0.185) (0.194)
Pl 0.381 0.376 0.314
(0.170) (0.169) (0.146)
Decision to colludet 1 2.928 2.742 2.540 3.571 3.563 3.179
(0.139) (0.142) (0.132) (0.163) (0.163) (0.142)
Period -0.00752 -0.0140 0.0214 -0.0166 -0.0182 0.0129
(0.0391) (0.0395) (0.0409) (0.0446) (0.0446) (0.0449)
Period2 -0.000612 -0.000467 -0.000953 -0.000307 -0.000249 -0.000566
(0.00140) (0.00142) (0.00142) (0.00165) (0.00165) (0.00161)
Cartel formedt 1 -0.771 -0.703 0.860 0.859
(0.230) (0.231) (0.593) (0.595)
Cartel detectedt 1 -0.620 -0.664 -0.395 -0.425
(0.298) (0.304) (0.487) (0.487)
Cartel reportedt 1 -1.650 -1.674
(0.681) (0.686)
Price deviationt 1 -0.0255 -0.0244 -0.908 -0.891
(0.170) (0.170) (0.583) (0.586)
Risky choicec 0.163 0.176 0.0321 0.0248
(0.0256) (0.0263) (0.0291) (0.0273)
Inconsistent preferences -0.215 -0.267 -0.209 -0.0941
(0.229) (0.230) (0.205) (0.185)
# of times busted -0.308 -0.409
(0.125) (0.151)
# of times colluded -0.00333 0.320
(0.0204) (0.129)
Observations 1710 1710 1710 1524 1524 1524
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Instruction
Welcome and thank you for taking part in this experiment. In this experiment you
can earn money. How much money you will earn depends on your decision and on
the decision made by other participants in this room.
The experiment will proceed in two parts. The currency used in Part 1 of the
experiment is Pound Sterling (GBP). The currency used in Part 2 is experimental
points. Each experimental point is worth 15 pence. All earnings will be paid to you
in cash at the end of the experiment.
Every participant receives exactly the same instructions. All decisions will be an-
onymous.
It is very important that you remain silent. If you have any questions, or need
assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you.
Instructions for Part 1
In the rst part of the experiment you will be asked to make 15 decisions. For
each line in the table in the next page there is a paired choice between two options
("Option A" and "Option B"). Only one of these 15 lines will be used in the end to
determine your earnings. You will only know which one at the end of the experiment.
Each line is equally likely to be chosen, so you should pay equal attention to the
choice you make in every line. At the end of the experiment a computerised random
number (between 1 and 15) determines which line is going to be paid.
Your earnings for the paid line depend on which option you chose: If you chose
option A in that line, you will receive £ 1. If you chose option B in that line, you will
receive either £ 2 or £ 0. To determine your earnings in the case you chose option B
there will be second computerised random number (between 1 and 20).
Instructions for Part 2
In this part of the experiment you will form a group with two other randomly chosen
participants in this room. Throughout the experiment you are matched with the
same two participants. All groups of three participants act independently of each
other.
This part of the experiment will be repeated at least 20 times. From the 20th round
onwards, in each round there is a one in ve (20%) chance that the experiment will
end.
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Instruction:
You are in the role of a rm that is in a market with two other rms.
In each round, you will have to choose a price for your product. This price must be
one of the following prices:
90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102.
You will only sell the product if your price is the lowest of the three prices chosen
by you and the other two rms in that round. If you sell the product, your earnings
are equal to the di¤erence between the price and the cost, which is 90:
Earnings = Price 90.
If you do not sell the product, you will not get any earnings but you do not have
costs either. If two or more rms sell at the same lowest price, the earnings will
be shared equally between them. After your price choice, you will be told whether
you have selected the lowest price as well as the price of the other rms. Before you
choose your price, you can decide to agree with the other rms to set the highest
price of 102 and share the earnings. This agreement is only valid if all three rms
want to agree on it. However, the price agreement is not binding and rms are not
required to set the agreed price.
The price agreement may be discovered by the computer. In that case, a ne of 8
points has to be paid. The computer can detect it in one out of 10 cases (a chance
of 10%).
A price agreement remains valid and can be discoveredas long as it has not been
discovered in a previous round. Once this has happened, you will not be ned in the
future, unless you make a price agreement again.
At the end of each round, you will be told
 the earnings you made in this round
 in case you agreed on a price if this agreement has been detected.
Final Payment:
At the beginning of the experiment you start with an initial endowment of 40 points
= 6 GBP. The earnings you earned in each round minus any ne that you paid will
be converted into cash. Each point is worth 15 pence, and we will round up the nal
payment to the next 10 pence. We guarantee a minimum earning of 2 GBP.
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Chapter 5
An Experimental Analysis of
Antitrust Enforcement under
Avoidance
The worse the ill that confronts them, the more men are driven to
evade it. The very savagery of a punishment has this e¤ect, and to avoid
the penalty for the one crime they have committed, men commit other
crimes. Cesare Beccaria (1764) after: Sanchirico (2006, p.1350)
5.1 Introduction
It is well established that rms that deliberately infringe competition law often use
a multitude of avoidance procedures to reduce their potential antitrust nes or the
likelihood of detection. Examples of such avoidance activities include consulting with
antitrust experts to litigate the reduction of any potential nes, destroying or cov-
ering up of incriminating evidence (Agisilaou, 2011), lobbying for favourable policy
guidelines, and the restructuring of a rms nance to qualify for an inability-to-pay
reduction (Stephan, 2006). Such avoidance activities have particular implications for
the design of public enforcement policies, as they a¤ect both the deterrence and the
social cost analysis. From a welfare perspective, avoidance expenditure cause an ad-
ditional cost to rms (Tabbach, 2010) and are socially wasteful as labour and capital
is diverted from more productive activities (see Sanchirico (2006) for a discussion
of the empirical importance of avoidance costs). Moreover, all else equal, avoidance
0This chapter is based on joint work with my supervisor, Subhasish M. Chowdhury.
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activities reduce the level of deterrence as expected nes decrease (Ehrlich, 1972).
Overall, after accounting for the need to counter this e¤ect by increasing enforcement
expenditures as well as for the wasteful avoidance costs, it is not generally possible
to say if the standard results obtained without including the possibility for avoidance
still remain valid (Malik, 1990).
Besides the prominence of avoidance in case law, so far there has been little
discussion about it in the academic literature of antitrust. In particular, to date
it is unclear how the possibility of avoidance expenditures may a¤ect the choice
to participate and engage in a (illegal) cartel. The purpose of this study is to gain
insights into rmsavoidance activities in a controlled laboratory environment. A key
advantage of using experimental methodology is the lack of the sample-selection bias
inherent to any empirical study on antitrust infringements, which by their nature
need to rely on the sample of detected and successfully prosecuted cartels.1 The
laboratory avoids this limitation and o¤ers full control and transparency over all
aspects of the rmsdecision, in particular over the arguably in the real world often
unobservable avoidance activities.
Central to this paper is a three player Bertrand game with inelastic demand and
constant marginal cost (Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000). Firms have the possibility
to collude, however, by doing so they expose themselves to the risk of antitrust
penalties. The innovation in the design is to add an avoidance option, in which we
allow rms to reduce their potential ne. We then compare the resulting market
outcome with a benchmark where rms cannot do so.
As mentioned before, arguably many avoidance activities lower the likelihood of
detection rather than the ne. However, allowing for a reduction in the detection rate,
which then benets the whole cartel, may cause free-riding on avoidance activities
by other group members. To avoid this additional complexity, while keeping the
basic intuition of the real world avoidance activities that occur in markets, we keep
detection rates constant and instead lower the ne load.
Further, in two treatments we allow rms to self-report in exchange for a leniency
discount, which allows us to address how avoidance inuences the e¤ectiveness of
leniency programmes. This is of particular interest for countries that have not (yet)
introduced a leniency policy, such as Indonesia or the Philippines, as recent research
by Innes (2001) suggests that an optimally designed leniency policy can prevent rms
1See Jolls et al., 1998 for a discussion of the benets of behavioural economics in analysing law
and economics. For examples see Normann and Hinloopen, 2009.
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from spending avoidance costs.
In summary, we investigate whether wrongdoers indeed use resources to avoid
sanctions, and how the possibility to avoid inuences cartel formation, prices and
collusive stability. The ndings of our study have implications for the optimal design
of antitrust policies, but are also of general interest for academic research that often
treated rms as spectators which, apart from using leniency, do not react to the
exogenous antitrust regime.
The following conclusions can be drawn from the present study. First, rms are
more willing to collude when they have the option to avoid. This e¤ect, however,
holds only absent leniency. Furthermore, the increased likelihood to collude trans-
lates into a higher rate of cartel formation. Taken together, these results suggest
that including a more realistic frame in experimental studies on antitrust enforce-
ment, which allows rms to be more than mere spectators, has signicant impact
on cartel formation that is intuitive and straightforward. In particular, it indicates
that avoidance can be used as a form of insurance against antitrust nes, which may
cause more risk-averse rms to collude. This hypothesis is conrmed by a regression
analysis, which reveals that a rms decision to opt for avoidance expenditures is
driven by its risk attitude as well as by its past experience of antitrust enforcement.
Supporting the intuition in Jensen et al. (2012), we nd that avoiding rms charge
higher prices. Further, while in general the possibility to use avoidance reduces the
rate of price deviations, we observe that rms that engage in avoidance deviate more
than twice as often when a leniency programme exists. Additionally, there is evidence
that some rms utilise avoidance as an alternative means to avoid being punished
for price deviations by other self-reporters.
While experimental research to date has abstracted away from the implications
of avoidance activities on law enforcement, a limited body of related theoretical
work exists. The seminal work by Malik (1990) debates the trade-o¤ between the
detection rate and the magnitude of punishment if criminals spend resources to avoid
detection. Likewise, Langlais (2008) discusses how an increase in the magnitude
of nes has an indirect adverse e¤ect by providing incentives to avoid detection
which decreases the probability of getting caught. Langlais nds that which e¤ect
dominates depends on the sensitivity of avoidance activities with respect to ne level
and detection rate. Nussim and Tabbach (2009) arrive at the same result, and argue
that subsidizing legal alternatives rather than punishing crime can help to reduce
crime and wasteful avoidance. If punishment is costly (e.g. the cost of running a
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prison), Tabbach (2010) shows that from a welfare perspective o¤enders should be
encouraged to avoid punishment, as costly avoidance can be a substitute for costly
public sanctions. However, a common limitation of these theoretical models is that
the severity of crime and the degree of avoidance are not endogenised. Most recently
Jensen et al. (2012) show that if it is possible for the rms to expend resources
to reduce the likelihood of getting caught, then it is more protable to commit a
more severe crime. To the extent of our knowledge, we are the rst to address
avoidance from a behavioral perspective, and our results indicate that many of the
above mentioned theoretical predictions are conrmed in an experimental setting,
while a few critical results turn out to be di¤erent in the data.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
experimental design and procedure. Results are provided in Section 3, and Section
4 concludes.
5.2 Experiment
5.2.1 Experimental Procedure
The experiment was conducted at the Centre for Behavioural and Experimental
Social Science (CBESS) at the University of East Anglia (UEA), and a total of 141
students from various backgrounds and nationalities participated.
The rst part of the experiment, run on pen and paper, employed the design by
Holt and Laury (2002) to measure individual risk preferences. Subjects then received
instructions (see the Appendix for copies of the instructions) for the second part of
the experiment, which was fully computerised using the experimental software z-tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). Following this, subjects completed a questionnaire, and could
ask further questions to the experimental supervisor, which were answered privately.
Finally, after the experiment nished, subjects were asked to ll out a demographics
and feedback survey.
The earnings for both parts of the experiment were computed at the end of
each session and made privately and in cash. While earnings for the rst part were
denoted in British pound, earnings for the second part were recorded in terms of
"experimental points", and converted to British pounds at a rate of 15p per point
at the end of the experiment. The average payment was £ 9.35, including an initial
endowment of £ 6 to cover potential losses. Sessions lasted between 45 and 60 minutes.
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5.2.2 Experimental Design
In the experiment, subjects were told that they represent a rm, operating in a
market with two other competitors.2 The market was characterised by one consumer
with inelastic demand, and rms experienced a constant cost of production of 90.
As in Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), the rm charging the lowest price earned its
price, whereas other rms earned nothing. In case of ties, the prot of (price-90) was
shared. The experiment was implemented as a repeated game with xed matching,
and subjects participated for at least 20 periods. For each period after the 20th
period, a random stopping rule with 1/5 chance was employed.
In total the experiment consisted of four treatments (Table 5.1). We employed
a 2x2-factorial design, in which we manipulated the availability of avoidance acts
vs. the availability to obtain a leniency discount.3 While the former allows us
to investigate how the option to avoid inuences market outcomes, the latter is of
particular interest as research suggest that an optimally designed leniency policy can
reduce the likelihood of such avoidance activities (Innes, 2003).
Table 5.1: Classication of treatments.
without Avoidance with Avoidance
without Leniency Fine Fine and Avoidance
with Leniency Leniency Leniency and Avoidance
At the beginning of each period, rms had to simultaneously decide if they want
to mutually agree to charge the highest possible price and share the market. Only
if all three rms in a market agreed on price-xing, they were informed about their
non-binding agreement. Such an agreement could be detected by a computerised
Antitrust Authority with 10% chance, which would then levy a ne of 8 points upon
the rms.4 Firms were liable for the illegal agreement until the agreement has been
detected (or revealed by means of a leniency application), so they could get ned
even in periods in which previous collusion took place and was not detected.
2Using three rms is important as arguably a duopoly is inherently more collusive (Huck et al.,
2004).
3The treatments without the option to spend avoidance expenditures are in line with the study
of Chowdhury and Wandschneider (2013), which is similar to Gillet et al. (2011).
4Note that the cartel detection rate of 10% is slightly below the empirical estimation by Bryant
and Eckard (1991) of 13%-17%, and that the ne of 8 points represents twice the collusive gain
from being in a cartel.
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In two treatments there was a decision stage in which rms were informed about
the possibility to reduce their potential ne by half at the expense of paying 1 point.
The cost of avoidance was implemented in order to prevent rms to reduce their
potential nes for free, and to reect the costs, such as legal cost or consultancy
fees, of the real-world avoidance activities. Note that avoidance inevitably lowered
expected punishment and following the rational choice of crime (Ehrlich, 1973) this
might a¤ect deterrence. The reduction in the potential ne was also valid in future
rounds, but its e¤ect stopped once the agreement got detected or reported. After
that, any new agreement was ned the full ne, unless an individual rm paid again
1 point to reduce its potential individual ne.
Firms then selected a price p from the discrete choice set f90; 91; ::101; 102g. and
learned the market outcome. In two treatments rms could decide to reveal the
existence of a cartel at the expense of one experimental point (cp. Hinloopen and
Soetevent, 2008). If a rm was the sole whistleblower, it received a full ne reduction.
In case two (three) rms self-report, their ne was reduced by half (one-third). In
the last stage, rms were informed about their nal earnings, whether collusion was
detected or not, and the number (but not identity) of any whistleblowers. In case
their agreement has not been detected, they were further informed whether or not
they had already engaged in avoidance activities to reduce their potential future ne.
The timing and information structure of the game is summarised in Figure 5.1:
Figure 5.1: Game Tree.
Collusion
Decision
Reporting
Decision
Final
Outcome
Learning  reporting and
detection
Detection
Possibility
Avoidance
Decision
Price
Decision
Learning pricesLearning formation
Treatment
Manipulation
Treatment
Manipulation
1. Each rm is asked whether or not it wishes to attempt collusion. In case
of a unanimous wish to collude, rms proceed with a non-binding agreement to
set the joint prot maximizing price of 102. If at least one rm decides against
collusion, rms are informed about each rivals choice and competition takes place
in the market.
2. In the treatments with avoidance, each rm can decide to reduce its future
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potential ne by 50% at the expense of one point.
3. Each rm sets a price from the set f90; 91; : : : ; 101; 102g. Firms then learn
their competitorsprice choice, and whether their price is the lowest of the three
submitted prices.
4. In the treatments with leniency, each rm has the opportunity to reveal the
existence of a cartel at the expense of one experimental point.
5. In the treatments without leniency, or if no rm self-reports, the cartel may
be detected by the Antitrust Authority with 10% probability.
6. In the last step, rms are informed about their nal earnings, whether collusion
was detected or not, and about the number (but not identity) of the whistleblowers.
In case a rm has avoided, it is informed if its potential ne is still reduced in the
next period.
At the end of the experiment, the number of experimental points earned in each
period minus the penalties paid is converted into cash. The earnings from the Holt
and Laury task and the Bertrand game are then summed up and paid out in private.
5.3 Results
The result section is divided into four parts. The rst part deals with the e¤ect
of avoidance on cartel formation, while the second part describes how often rms
actually use avoidance. Part three assesses the e¤ect on prices and part four the
e¤ect on cartel stability. The last part concludes with a discussion of total welfare.
Due to the dependency of observations over time and within each market, we conduct
non-parametric tests using the aggregated observations of each group. In total we
have 47 independent observations from 141 subjects. Unless reported otherwise, all
reported test statistics are two-tailed.
5.3.1 Cartel Formation
We start by examining the propensity to collude, which refers to the binary choice
to attempt cartel formation in Step 1. Behaviorally, we expect that a risk-averse
rm which otherwise would not have joined a cartel is now more likely to join, since
avoidance acts like a form of insurance.
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Table 5.2: Propensity to collude - Average (Std. Dev.) results per
treatment.
without Avoidance with Avoidance
Fine 50.74 % (19.03) 57.22 % (24.52)
Leniency 53.84 % (10.42) 52.33 % (13.32)
Note: The propensity to collude is computed using the binary decision of a rm to attempt
collusion or not.
For each treatment, Table 5.2. reveals the means and standard deviations of
the rate at which rms aim to collude. It is apparent that absent leniency, the
propensity to collude is about 7 % higher with than without avoidance. Moreover,
the average rates in the leniency treatments are about equal. In the next step,
we test for signicance of the di¤erence between treatments by means of a random
intercept panel logistic regression with clustering at the group level to control for the
potential dependency of decision by rms within the same market. The dependent
variable is the decision to collude or not in Step 1. As independent variables we use
treatment dummies, the lagged decision to collude or not from the previous period,
and lagged regressors indicating if a rm experienced deviation from an existing cartel
(Lagged Deviation), got detected (Lagged Detection) or reported (Lagged Reported).
Further, we control for potential time e¤ects (Period), risk attitudes (Risky Choices)
and socio-demographics.
To test if the e¤ects are statistically signicant we estimate them separately for
Fine and Leniency by means of a generalized linear latent and mixed model (Rabe-
Hesketh et al., 2005). Details of the regression result are presented in Table 5.3.
The regression analysis indeed supports our initial observation. The marginal
e¤ect of the Fine and Avoidance dummy is signicant at the 1% level, while there is
no signicant e¤ect in the leniency treatment. The regression results further indicate
that rms which attempted to form a cartel previously are more inclined to do so in
the following period, and are less willing to do so if their previous cartel got detected
or reported. Finally, we observe mild evidence that the propensity to collude is
declining over time.
Result 1:
Given that no leniency programme exists, the willingness to collude is signicantly
higher if rms are able to avoid.
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Table 5.3: Random intercept logistic regression on the decision to collude.
Dependent Variable: Decision to collude Base: Fine Base: Leniency
Constant -1.077 -0.139
(0.644) (0.606)
Fine and Avoidance 0.760
(0.260)
Leniency and Avoidance 0.268
(0.315)
Lagged Decision to collude 1.245 2.103
(0.222) (0.315)
Lagged Cartel Deviation -0.326 -0.806
(0.281) (0.427)
Lagged Cartel Detected -0.713
(0.384)
Lagged Cartel Reported -0.872
(0.356)
Period -0.0370 -0.0823
(0.0157) (0.0203)
Risky Choices 0.104 0.00129
(0.0699) (0.0560)
Age -0.275 -0.112
(0.0660) (0.0282)
Male -0.0959 1.305
(0.305) (0.272)
British 0.697 0.0808
(0.263) (0.245)
Observations 1620 1575
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
A higher likelihood of collusion attempt raises questions about how often a cartel
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actually forms, which is the second main measure used in the literature to evaluate
deterrence (Hinloopen and Soetevent, 2008; Bigoni et al., 2012). In each period, none,
one, two or all of the rms in a market could opt for collusion. The distribution of
the number of rms that agree to collude is provided in the left hand side of Figure
5.2. As is immediate from the inspection of the right column, which indicates how
often all three rms in a market wished to collude, most of the time rms did not
manage to reach consensus to establish a cartel.
Figure 5.2: Histogram of the number of rms in a market that want to
collude (Left) and of the number of cartelised markets given that cartels
carry over (Right).
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What is striking though, is how the higher willingness to collude in Fine and
Avoidance translates into an almost 50% higher rate of cartel formation. We test for
statistical di¤erences by a two-tailed Mann-Whitney test and nd that the fraction
of cartels reaching consensus is signicantly di¤erent at the 1% level.5 No similar
di¤erence in the Leniency treatments is detected.
Result 2:
Given that no leniency programme exists, rms form signicantly more cartels if they
are able to avoid.
Finally, taking into account that undetected cartels carry over into the next
period, we compare the average fraction of markets that had a collusive agreement
in place. As can be seen in the right hand side of Figure 5.2, treatments vary in their
e¤ectiveness to reduce the occurrence of cartels (Kruskal-Wallis test, p = 0:01). In
5We run the non-parametric test using one observation per market and period. Aggregating the
data further over time yields a p-value of 0.13.
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particular, both leniency treatments prove successful in reducing the occurrence of
cartel, with about 35% fewer cartels existing than in the treatments absent leniency.
The di¤erence is signicant (Mann-Whitney test, p < 0:01). While markets have a
10% higher rate of cartelization in the treatments with avoidance, this proves insig-
nicant (Mann-Whitney test, p > 0:10). Likewise, a pairwise comparison between
Fine and Fine and Avoidance, and Leniency and Leniency and Avoidance does not
yield signicant di¤erences (Mann-Whitney test, p > 0:10).
5.3.2 Avoidance
Before proceeding to examine prices, it will be necessary to establish how often rms
that are in a cartel actually decide to reduce their liability to nes through avoidance.
For this, we observe the outcome of the binary decision to opt for avoidance in each
period in which a rm was given the choice to do so. Recall, that once a rm
decided to engage in avoidance, the reduction in the ne load carries over into future
period until the cartel gets detected. That means a rm which already has reduced
its potential ne cannot decide to spent avoidance expenditures again, unless the
previous cartel is detected. However, a rm that decides not to spent avoidance
resources can decide again in the subsequent periods, as long as the cartel has not
yet been discovered.
The average percentage at which rms engage in avoidance is presented in the
left column of Table 5.4. It can be seen from the data that rms in Leniency and
Avoidance opt for avoidance more often than rms in Fine and Avoidance. The
mean rate of avoidance with leniency is about 12% higher, which suggests that rms
use avoidance procedures more often when a leniency programme exists.6 However,
this might be the result of an inherent bias: a rm that decided not to engage in
avoidance is asked again in the subsequent periods, conditional on that the cartel
still exists. Whether a cartel continues into future periods may well be a¤ected by
the existence of a leniency programme. In particular, there may exist longer chains
of repeated observations of value 0 from a rm that does not wish to spend avoidance
expenditures in the Fine and Avoidance treatment. A solution to this potential bias
is to consider only the decision in the rst period in which a cartel has been formed.
The adjusted mean rate is then 63% in Fine and Avoidance as compared to 58% in
6We can not test the signicance of this di¤erence by means of a non-parametric test, as the
individual decisions to engage in avoidance or not create an unbalanced panel within and between
groups, making the comparison of group level observations unfeasible.
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Leniency and Avoidance.
As the reduction in the potential ne carries over into future periods, it is of
additional interest to examine how often a rm in a cartel was facing a reduced,
rather than the full ne. On average, a rm in a cartel was liable for the reduced
rather than the full ne in 66% of the cases in Fine and Avoidance, as opposed to
50% in Leniency and Avoidance.
Table 5.4: Avoidance - Average results (Std. Dev.) per treatment.
Firms using avoidance procedures Firms facing reduced ne
Fine 22.47 % (41.85) 66.43 % (47.27)
Leniency 34.73 % (47.86) 50.29 % (50.14)
Notes: The percentage of rms using avoidance procedures is computed using the indi-
vidual binary decision of a rm to avoid or not. The percentage of rms facing a reduced
ne is computed taking into account that ne reductions carry over into future periods.
To better understand the motivational drivers behind the decision to engage in
avoidance activities, we employ a random-e¤ects logistic regression on the unbalanced
panel. The dependent variable is the binary decision to conduct avoidance activities
or not, given that a rm is not already engaging in such activities. We use rms
in the Fine and Avoidance treatment as our comparative benchmark. Explanatory
variables are a treatment dummy (Leniency and Avoidance), and the number of
times a rms has been ned for being in a cartel in the past. We further control for
risk-preferences and demographics. The results, shown in Table 5.5, indicate that
there is indeed no statistically signicant e¤ect of the existence of a leniency regime
on the decision to opt for avoidance. Instead, the decision to avoid is largely driven
by having experienced cartel enforcement in the past. Also, the more risk loving a
experimental subject is, the less likely the subject will reduce the potential ne. This
supports our previous intuition that avoidance acts a an insurance, which in turn
allows more risk-averse rms to collude. We conclude:
Result 3:
The decision to avoid is driven by a rmsrisk attitude as well as by its experience
of antitrust enforcement.
92
Table 5.5: Random e¤ects logistic regression on the decision to engage in
avoidance.
Dependent Variable: Decision to avoid Coe¢ cient
(Std. Error)
Constant -3.768
(2.118)
Leniency and Avoidance 0.299
(0.632)
# of times detected so far 0.528
(0.161)
Risky Choices -0.195
(0.0804)
Age 0.165
(0.0946)
Male -1.130
(0.507)
British 0.884
(0.444)
Observations 273
Notes: This table presents the estimated coe¢ cients of a random e¤ects logit model where the
decision to engage in avoidance is the dependent variable. Random e¤ects are introduced at the
market level. Firms in the Fine and Avoidance treatment are used as the benchmark.
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
5.3.3 Prices
We now turn to the experimental evidence on prices, where we distinguish between
the asking price, which is the average of the three prices in a given market, and
the market price, which is the lowest of the three stated prices. Before turning to a
regression analysis, we discuss some key statistics. Table 5.6 displays average asking
and market prices, distinguishing further whether a market was competing or collud-
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ing when reaching the price decision stage. As can be seen from the top-left part of
the table, prices in competing markets are a few points above the Bertrand equilib-
rium of 91 and vary only slightly between treatments. Further, there exists a clear
gain from colluding as average prices are about 4:5 points higher than competitive
ones. In line with Bigoni et al. (2012), cartel prices are higher in treatments with
leniency. Crucially, collusive prices in treatments with the possibility of avoidance
appear higher than without the option to use avoidance.
A similiar picture emerges when we compute the average market price. The res-
ults, shown in the lower part of Table 5.6, indicate that prices in competing markets
fall almost to marginal cost level, while the average market price in colluding groups is
around 95. The summary statistics may lead to the conclusion that average collusive
market prices are higher in treatments with than without avoidance procedures.
Table 5.6: Average Price (Std. Dev.) per treatment.
Competing Markets Colluding Markets
without avoidance with avoidance without avoidance with avoidance
A
sk
in
g Fine 93.79 (3.97) 92.14 (2.63) 95.75 (4.74) 97.67 (4.80)
Leniency 92.38 (3.00) 93.29 (3.92) 97.85 (4.29) 100.57 (3.04)
M
ar
ke
t
Fine 91.56 (0.90) 91.22 (0.25) 93.82 (3.25) 95.58 (4.22)
Leniency 91.33 (1.19) 91.93 (1.90) 94.60 (3.10) 96.78 (4.46)
Notes: The asking (market) price is computed using the average (the lowest) of the three
stated prices per period and market.
For a more detailed investigation of prices we use a random e¤ects tobit regression
with the price choice of an individual rm as the dependent variable (cp. Gillet et
al., 2011).7 We use rms in the Fine treatment without a cartel as the comparative
benchmark, and introduce random e¤ects at the market level. Independent variables
include various treatment dummies, divided between whether a rm is in a collusive
or competitive market, as well as a control for potential time e¤ects. Table 5.7 shows
the outcome of this regression, which widely conrms the initial remarks.
First, note that being in a cartel leads to a strong increase in the chosen prices
across all treatments, which is in line with the increase in prices observed in Table 5.6.
While of di¤erent magnitude, the coe¢ cients of all treatment dummies for cartels
7There were 164 left-censored and 658 right-censored observations.
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Table 5.7: Random e¤ects tobit regression on rmschosen price.
Dependent Variable: Chosen Price Coe¢ cient
(St. Error)
Constant 94.42
(1.000)
Cartel Fine 2.765
(0.438)
Cartel Fine and Avoidance 5.935
(1.419)
Cartel Leniency 4.648
(1.528)
Cartel Leniency and Avoidance 8.903
(1.465)
No Cartel Fine and Avoidance -0.156
(1.423)
No Cartel Leniency -1.382
(1.421)
No Cartel Leniency and Avoidance -0.0629
(1.393)
Period -0.0514
(0.0115)
Observations 3195
Notes: This table presents the estimated coe¢ cients of a random e¤ects tobit model where the
chosen price is the dependent variable. Random e¤ects are introduced at the market level. Firms
in the Fine treatment without cartel are used as the benchmark. Independent variables: Fine,
Fine and Avoidance, Leniency, Leniency and Avoidance = dummy variable equal to 1 if price is
set in a given treatment, distinguished between markets with (Cartel) and without (No Cartel)
cartel. Period = round number.
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
95
are positive and signicant. Pairwise testing the di¤erence in the coe¢ cients with
a 2-test reveals that when there exists a cartel, the di¤erence between Fine and
Avoidance and Leniency and Avoidance is mildly signicant (p = 0:05). This further
conrms that prices in the Leniency and Avoidance treatment are higher than in
Fine and Avoidance. More importantly, the di¤erence between Fine and Fine and
Avoidance (p = 0:02) and between Leniency and Leniency and Avoidance (p < 0:01)
are statistically signicant, supporting higher collusive prices in the treatments with
the option to engage in avoidance.
However, there is a potential inconsistency with this argument. As we discussed
earlier, not all rms that are in a cartel actually use avoidance. Hence, prices in the
Fine and Avoidance and Leniency and Avoidance treatment do not truly reect the
price decision of those rm which avoid, but are a combination of prices from two
sets of rms: those that engage in avoidance and those who do not.
Further, we have to take into account that a potential ne reduction carries over
into later period and might a¤ect the price decision. In order to assess whether the
higher prices in Leniency and Avoidance than in Fine and Avoidance still hold, we
split the data from Table 5.5 into observations where a rm in a cartel is facing a
ne, and observations where a rm in a cartel is facing the full ne. The corres-
ponding price is shown in Table 5.8. The results indicate that prices between rms
that engaged in avoidance and those who did not are about equal in Leniency and
Avoidance, but are lower in Fine and Avoidance. Potentially, this is due to more
frequent price deviations, which we will analyse in more detail later on.
Table 5.8: Average Chosen Price (Std. Dev.) per treatment.
Chosen price if a rm in a cartel is...
facing reduced ne facing full ne
Fine and Avoidance 96.91 (4.89) 99.19 (4.27)
. Leniency and Avoidance 100.55 (3.21) 100.58 (2.88)
Observations 367 227
Finally, we investigate the e¤ect of avoidance on prices by means of a random
e¤ects tobit regression analysis in which we again use the rms price in a given
period as the dependent variable. As before, random e¤ects are introduced at the
market level. Explanatory variables include two dummies, indicating whether a rm
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is in a cartel and whether it used avoidance expenditures in the current period.
Further regressors are the market price of the previous period, a dummy indicating
if the rm experienced a price deviation in the previous period, as well as a control
for round e¤ects. The results are presented in Table 5.9.
Not surprisingly, rms set signicantly higher prices when they are in a cartel.
They also respond to higher prices in the previous period by increasing their cur-
rent price, and react to price deviations by reducing their price. Of greater interest,
however, is that they also increase their price when they have spent avoidance ex-
penditures. This supports the intuition in Jensen et al. (2012). We can therefore
conclude:
Result 4:
Firms that engage in avoidance activities charge higher prices.
5.3.4 Stability
For the next stage of the analysis we focus on successfully formed cartels and invest-
igate their stability, which is measured in two ways. First, we explore how often a
rm in a cartel undercuts the joint prot maximizing price, and second, we examine
how often a rm self-reports its collusive agreement. Note that a rms avoidance
activity is private information, and competitors never knew whether a rm insured
itself against potential nes. Also recall that avoidance activities only reduce a rms
individual ne, and are not a public good. Given that a rm has paid avoidance
expenditures, which carry over into future periods, we would expect it to stick to the
collusive agreement in order to gain joint cartel prots rather than one-shot deviation
prots.
Table 5.10 indicates the rate of price deviations for each treatment. From this
data we can see that indeed fewer rms deviate in the treatments with avoidance,
which also matches with the ndings of higher market prices in Table 5.6. For the
purpose of understanding how the individual rate of defection translates into cartel
stability, we compute the fraction of cartels with at least one price defection in a
given period. Showing a similar trend as the individual deviation rates, the fraction
of cartels with at least one rm deviating is around 86% in Fine, and 72% in Fine
and Avoidance. Likewise, the rates for Leniency and Leniency and Avoidance are
96% and 63% respectively. While the observed di¤erence is intuitive and large, we
nd no statistically signicant di¤erence between either the rate of price deviations
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Table 5.9: Random e¤ects tobit regression on rmschosen price.
Dependent Variable: Chosen Price Coe¢ cient
(St. Error)
Constant 50.14
(3.083)
Firm is in cartel 5.481
(0.289)
Firm used avoidance 2.592
(0.726)
Lagged Market Price 0.474
(0.0331)
Lagged Deviation in earlier cartel -2.892
(0.280)
Period -0.0307
(0.0116)
Observations 3054
Notes: This table presents the estimated coe¢ cients of a random e¤ects tobit model where the
chosen price is the dependent variable. Random e¤ects are introduced at the market level. Inde-
pendent variables are : Firm is in cartel = dummy variable taking value 1 if a rm is in a cartel.
Firm used avoidance = dummy variable taking value 1 if a rm spent avoidance expenditures.
Lagged Market Price = the market price of the previous period. Lagged Deviation in earlier car-
tel = dummy variable taking value 1 if rm experienced a price deviation in the prevous period.
Period = round number.
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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or the fraction of cartels (Mann-Whitney test, p > 0:10). This may be due to a
limited number of independent observations, as only 8% (19%) of the markets in
Fine and Avoidance (Leniency and Avoidance) were collusive.
Table 5.10: Price Deviations - Average results (Std. Dev.) per treatment.
without Avoidance with Avoidance
Fine 69.84 % (27.70) 57.14 % (18.34)
Leniency 50.25 % (34.97) 41.56 % (35.61)
Notes: The rate of deviation (conditional on the existence of a cartel) is calculated using
a dummy that takes the value 1 if a rm in a cartel chose a price below 102.
In the next step, the relationship between the decision to avoid and the decision to
deviate is tested. Across treatments the mean square contingency coe¢ cient which
measures the correlation between the two binary dummy variables avoidance and
deviation yields  0:04 and indicates no statistically signicant relationship between
the two variables. Despite, given that a rm decided to avoid, 22:5% of the rms
deviate in Fine and Avoidance, as compared to 54:54% in Leniency and Avoidance,
the di¤erence being signicant at the 1% level.
Result 5:
Given that a rm uses avoidance, it deviates more than twice as much when a leniency
programme exists.
A likely explanation for this nding is that a rm in the Leniency and Avoidance
treatment can reduce its potential nes to 4 points by spending avoidance expendit-
ures, and it can further reduce its ne through self-reporting. This might make
price deviations more attractive. To conclude the result section, we therefore have a
detailed look at the self-reporting decision.
The importance of a rms avoidance decision for the e¤ectiveness of corporate
leniency has recently been discussed in Innes (2001), who argues that under an
optimally designed leniency programme self-reporting rms will not spend resources
on avoidance. The rst column of Table 5.11 shows the average rate of reporting per
leniency treatment. We can observe that every second rm self-reports in Leniency,
while one in three self-reports in Leniency and Avoidance. A closer look at the
reporting rate reveals how the decision to deviate and the decision to self-report are
interlinked. The second column of Table 5.11 reports how many rms that deviated
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from the collusive agreement also self-reported, while the third column focuses on
those rms that experienced deviation by another cartel member, which is a proxy
for using leniency as a punishment mechanism. For both rates, the same pattern can
be observed: there is a lower rate of self-reporting in the treatment with avoidance.
However, as discussed previously, not every rm decided to avoid when it has the
opportunity to do so. Hence, drawing conclusions without distinguishing between
those rms that do and do not avoid will lead to biased results. In the next step
we therefor observe the percentage of rms that self-report, given their avoidance
decision.
Given that a rm spent resources on avoidance, 54.54% of the rms self-report
as compared to only 13.76% if a rm did not opt for avoidance. This indicates that
rms which avoid are also more likely to self-report. A correlation analysis between
the decision to avoiding and self-report supports this ndings, as the decision to
avoid and self-report is weakly positively related, with a correlation coe¢ cient of
0:34.8 This indicates that in the presence of a leniency programme, some rms
use a combination of avoidance, price deviation and self-reporting to cheat on their
counterparts.
Overall, we therefore summarise:
Result 6:
Firms that opt for avoidance do tend to self-report more often.
Table 5.11: Reporting - Average results (Std. Dev.) per treatment.
Reporting
given own
deviation
given other
deviation
without
Avoidance
54.36 % (11.54) 34.12 % (09.31) 53.17 % (11.50)
with Avoidance 36.63 % (35.35) 22.13 % (24.42) 29.68 % (36.54)
Notes: The rate of reporting is calculated using a dummy that takes the value 1 if a rm
liable for a cartel self-reports.
8As a word of caution, the majority of observations in the Leniency and Avoidance treatment
are categorized by a rm neither avoiding nor reporting. Only 18 observations exits in which a rm
avoided and then reported, limiting the scope for statistical analysis.
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5.3.5 Welfare
Finally, let us assess how avoidance inuences total welfare. Recall that engaging in
avoidance and self-reporting were costly activities. As any ne transfer from rms
to the Antitrust Authority is welfare neutral, total welfare is dened as the sum
of producer surplus, consumer surplus, and the cost of engaging in avoidance and
self-reporting.
While producer surplus is the di¤erence between the price of the lowest seller and
the marginal cost of 90, the average consumer surplus is dened as the di¤erence
between the maximum willingness to pay of 102 and the actual market price. As
was indicated earlier in Table 5.5, consumers are worse o¤ when rms can engage in
avoidance, and this hold with and without the presence of a leniency programme.
In terms of total welfare, Table 5.12 provides the total amount spent on avoidance
and leniency. Of course, the amount spent on avoidance and self-reporting partly
depends on the number of successfully formed cartels as well as the stability of the
cartel agreement.
Table 5.12: Social Cost per treatment.
Leniency
Fine and
Avoidance
Leniency and
Avoidance
Avoidance Cost 40 33
Self-reporting Cost 32 37
Total: 32 40 70
5.4 Conclusion
This study reports a rst attempt to experimentally investigate the e¤ects of antitrust
avoidance activities on market outcomes. antitrust practitioners widely acknowledge
that rms react to antitrust enforcement by spending costly avoidance e¤orts in
order to reduce their expected ne. Such avoidance expenditures are of particular
importance to policy makers, as avoidance costs inuence the social cost analysis
which underlies the design of optimal enforcement regimes (cp. Malik, 1993). To
date, it has not yet been tested how allowing for such activities inuences insights
from cartel formation experiments.
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Using a repeated three rm Bertrand game with the possibility of collusion, we
allow rms to reduce their potential antitrust ne by spending avoidance resources.
Additionally, we impose two treatments which resemble a corporate leniency pro-
gramme as an alternative means of reducing ones ne.
We demonstrate that rms are more willing to collude when they are able to
avoid, and that allowing for avoidance increases cartel formation. This supports our
initial hypothesis that avoidance can be used as a form of insurance against antitrust
nes, which may cause more risk-averse rms to collude. This ndings is supported
by a regression analysis on the rms avoidance decision, which nds that the main
drivers behind the decision to avoid are the risk-attitudes and past experiences of
antitrust enforcement.
With respect to consumer welfare, we observe that rms that engage in avoidance
activities charge higher prices, which conrms the intuition in Jensen et al. (2012).
Finally, with respect to collusive stability we observe that while the possibility to
avoid in general leads to fewer price deviations, a rm which has decided to avoid
deviates more than twice as often when a leniency programme exists. This indicates
that in the presence of a leniency programme, some rms utilise avoidance as an
alternative means to avoid being punished for price deviations. Supporting this,
rms that engage in avoidance procedures also tend to self-report more often.
Overall, the results call for more rened research into the e¤ect of avoidance
procedures on the e¤ectiveness of corporate leniency programmes. In particular,
it is of interest if an optimally designed leniency policy as in Innes (2001) indeed
reduced the avoidance expenditures. In future research, one should also investigate
the robustness of this result by allowing for avoidance activities which reduce the
detection rate, rather than the ne level, as the additional group dynamics introduced
by the free-riding problem may well destabilise the collusive agreement.
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5.5 Appendix
Instructions
Welcome and thank you for taking part in this experiment. In this experiment you
can earn money. How much money you will earn depends on your decision and on
the decision made by other participants in this room.
The experiment will proceed in two parts. The currency used in Part 1 of the
experiment is Pound Sterling (GBP). The currency used in Part 2 is experimental
points. Each experimental point is worth 15 pence. All earnings will be paid to you
in cash at the end of the experiment.
Every participant receives exactly the same instructions. All decisions will be an-
onymous.
It is very important that you remain silent. If you have any questions, or need
assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you.
Instructions for Part 1
In the rst part of the experiment you will be asked to make 15 decisions. For
each line in the table in the next page there is a paired choice between two options
("Option A" and "Option B"). Only one of these 15 lines will be used in the end to
determine your earnings. You will only know which one at the end of the experiment.
Each line is equally likely to be chosen, so you should pay equal attention to the
choice you make in every line. At the end of the experiment a computerised random
number (between 1 and 15) determines which line is going to be paid.
Your earnings for the paid line depend on which option you chose: If you chose
option A in that line, you will receive £ 1. If you chose option B in that line, you will
receive either £ 2 or £ 0. To determine your earnings in the case you chose option B
there will be second computerised random number (between 1 and 20).
Instructions for Part 2
In this part of the experiment you will form a group with two other randomly chosen
participants in this room. Throughout the experiment you are matched with the
same two participants. All groups of three participants act independently of each
other.
This part of the experiment will be repeated at least 20 times. From the 20th round
onwards, in each round there is a one in ve (20%) chance that the experiment will
continue for another round.
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Instruction:
You are in the role of a rm that is in a market with two other rms.
In each round, you will have to choose a price for your product. This price must be
one of the following prices:
90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102.
You will only sell the product if your price is the lowest of the three prices chosen
by you and the other two rms in that round. If you sell the product, your earnings
are equal to the di¤erence between the price and the cost, which is 90:
Earnings = Price 90.
If you do not sell the product, you will not get any earnings but you do not have
costs either.
If two or more rms sell at the same lowest price, the earnings will be shared
equally between them.
After your price choice, you will be told whether you have selected the lowest
price as well as the price of the other rms.
Before you choose your price, you can decide to agree with the other rms to set
the highest price of 102 and share the earnings. This agreement is only valid if all
three rms want to agree on it. However, the price agreement is not binding and
rms are not required to set the agreed price.
The price agreement may be discovered by the computer. In that case, a ne has to
be paid. The computer can discover the agreement in two ways. First, the computer
can detect it in one out of ve cases (a chance of 20%). Second, any of the rms can
report the agreement at the expense of 1 point.
If you or either of the other two rms report, the agreement gets detected with
certainty. However, your ne gets reduced as follows:
 If you are the only rm to report, you will not pay the ne but the others
will pay the full ne.
 If you report and one other rm also reports, then you pay 1/2 of the ne.
The remaining rm will pay the full ne.
 If you report and both other rms report, then you will pay 2/3 of the ne.
 If you do not report and at least one other rm report, then you will pay
the full ne.
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A price agreement remains valid and can be discovered or reported as long as it
has not been discovered or reported in a previous round. Once this has happened,
you will not be ned in the future, unless you make a price agreement again.
Normally the ne is 4 points, but there is a possibility to reduce your ne. After you
made a price agreement, or in any later round as long as the agreement has not yet
been detected, you can reduce a potential ne to 2 points at the expense of paying
1 point immediately. The reduction in the potential ne will also be valid in future
rounds -e.g. if you renew an agreement-, but it stops if the agreement gets detected.
After detection, any new agreement will be ned the full 4 points, unless you pay
again 1 point to reduce your potential ne.
At the end of each round, you will be told
 the earnings you made in this round
 in case you agreed on a price if this agreement has been detected or reported.
Final Payment:
At the beginning of the experiment you start with an initial endowment of 40 points
= 6 GBP. The earnings you earned in each round minus any ne or reporting cost
that you paid will be converted into cash. Each point is worth 15 pence, and we will
round up the nal payment to the next 10 pence. We guarantee a minimum earning
of 2 GBP.
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Chapter 6
Summary
This thesis consists of four contributions to specic policy issues related to optimal
antitrust enforcement. Chapter 2 and 3 contribute to on-going debate on whether
cartel ringleaders should be eligible for corporate leniency. Chapter 4 takes a more
fundamental look on the functioning of antitrust enforcement by investigating if the
magnitude of antitrust nes and the likelihood of having them imposed on rms are
indeed substitutable in their deterrence e¤ect. Finally, Chapter 5 discusses anti-
trust enforcement when rms can engage in costly avoidance e¤orts to reduce their
expected nes.
The case study presented in Chapter 2 is the rst scientic investigation of cartel
ringleaders. Using a sample of 75 European cartels, we identify the traits and char-
acteristics of 14 ringleader cartels. Several interesting observations are made: First,
cartels often had more than one ringleader. Second, the role of ringleaders is very
diverse and third, ringleaders were typically the largest cartel members. Chapter
2 further presents a model, analysing the e¤ect of ringleader exclusion on collusive
prices. It is shown that under fairly general conditions, prices can be higher when
the ringleader is excluded. In particular, this can be the case if antitrust nes depend
on individual cartel gains in a nonlinear fashion.
Chapter 3 investigates the likely e¤ects of ringleader exclusion on cartel form-
ation, prices and stability by means of a laboratory experiment. By comparing
treatments where the ringleader could (not) self-report a cartel in exchange for a
leniency discount, we observe that excluding the ringleader does not provide addi-
tional deterrence. While an exclusionary policy destabilised cartels, it also reduces
the race to the courtroom e¤ect, resulting overall in fewer reported cartels.
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In the fourth chapter, we explore the e¤ect of investigations and nes on cartels,
and in particular investigate if di¤erent combinations of detection rate and cartel ne
are substitutes in their deterrence e¤ect. In the absence of a leniency programme,
detection rates and nes are indeed substitutable, but when a leniency programme
exists, rms are more deterred by low rates of detection and high nes. In particu-
lar, such a regime lowers the overall incidence of cartelised markets signicantly more
than a high detection and low ne regime. Overall, our research suggests that anti-
trust agencies can indeed economise on enforcement costs and achieve a higher degree
of deterrence by reducing the probability of detection and increasing the severity of
the nes.
Lastly, Chapter 5 explores the e¤ect of avoidance activities on a cartel by means
of a market experiment. It shows that the possibility to avoid may trigger more
risk-averse rms to collude, which translates into a higher rate of cartel formation.
Supporting the intuition in Jensen et al. (2012), we nd that avoiding rms charge
higher prices. Further, while in general the possibility to use avoidance reduces the
rate of price deviations, we observe that rms that engage in avoidance deviate more
than twice as often when a leniency programme exists. Additionally, there is evidence
that some rms utilise avoidance as an alternative means to avoid being punished
for price deviations by other self-reporters.
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